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LIMITED ADMISSIBILITYAND ITS LIMITATIONS
LISA DUFRAIMONT,
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the challenges facing juries and judges in adjudicating cases is the
obligation to use evidence for limited purposes. Evidence inadmissible for
one purpose is frequently admissible for other purposes, a situation known as
"limited admissibility"' IWhere limited admissibility arises in jury trials,
courts generally deliver limiting instructions outlining the inferences that can
legitimately be drawn from the evidence and identifying prohibited lines of
reasoning to be avoided.2 Limiting instructions represent an expedient
solution to limited-admissibility problems, but they create obvious problems
of their own. A thoughtful observer might suspect-as psychological studies
confirm-that limiting instructions are likely to fail in their purpose of
Faculty of Law, Queen's University. I would like to thank Don Stuart and my other
Queen's Law colleagues for their incisive comments on an earlier draft of this paper
presented at a faculty works-in-progress seminar.
1 See e.g. Alan WBryant, Sidney N Lederman & Michelle K Fuerst, Sopinka, Lederman &
Bryant: TheLaw ofEvidence in Canada, 3d ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2009) at 74;
David P Leonard, The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules ofLimited
Admissibility, ed by Richard D Friedman, loose-leaf (consulted on 14 June 2011),
(Gaithersburg, NY: Aspen, 2001) ch 1 at 3 [Leonard, Wigmore]. See also Mirjan R
Damaika, Evidence Law Adrift (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1997)
(discussing this phenomenon under the rubric, "partial admissibility rules" at 18); David
M Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law ofEvidence, 5th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010)
(using the label "restricted admissibility" at 10).
2 See e.g. R v White, 2011 SCC 13, [2011] 1 SCR 433 [White] ("[t]he goal of ...
providing a limiting instruction is . . . to prevent the jury from considering the
evidence ... with respect to one or more issues" at para 30).
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constraining jury reasoning. Jurors may not understand such instructions,
and even if they do understand, they may be unable or unwilling to
follow them.
Still, questioning our legal system's faith in limiting instructions can be
tricky. Courts in both Canada and the United States frequently interpret
criticisms of the assumption that juries follow instructions as attacks on the
jury system itself.' Regrettably, this line of thinking insulates from
examination not only the lay jury but also the largely judge-made procedural
rules that may lead juries astray. Given the importance of the jury in the
common-law system, particularly in criminal cases, one can readily
understand why judges avoid reasoning in ways that undermine the jury.' But
refining procedural rules to help juries understand and comply with the law
should enhance and not detract from the legitimacy of the jury system. This
paper aims to demonstrate how the courts'approach to limited admissibility
can be improved-both by reducing the reliance on limiting instructions and
by adjusting the content ofthose instructions-without calling into question
the institution of trial by jury.
The paper explores the concept of limited admissibility in the common
law of evidence,7 with an emphasis on the approach taken by Canadian
3 See e.g. Daniel D Blinka, "Delusion or Despair: The Concept ofLimitedAdmissibility in
the Law of Evidence" (1989) 13:2AmJ TrialAdvoc781 [Blinka, "Delusion"] ("[d]espair
arises because it is widely recognized that juries cannot follow these directives" at 781).
See also the discussion in Part II.B, below.
See e.g. Leonard, Wifgmore, supra note 1, ch I at 23.
s See especially Rv Corbett, [1988] 1 SCR 670 at 691-92, [1988] 4 WWR 481 [Corbett
cited to SCR]. See also infra note 120.
6 In Canada, many of the most serious criminal cases are tried byjury. Importantly,jury trial
is normally compulsory in murder cases. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss
469-71. A criminal accused who faces at least five years' imprisonment also has a
constitutional right to jury trial under paragraph 11(f) of the Canadian Charter ofRights
and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Phrases like "common law of evidence" are used in this paper in reference to the system of
evidentiary regulation in place in common-law countries, including its common law,
statutory, and constitutional components.
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courts in criminal cases.8 The analysis begins in Part II with an overview of
the role of limited admissibility in evidentiary regulation, including its
relationship to our larger system of exclusionary rules, the psychological
findings that cast doubt on the efficacy of limiting instructions, and the
conceptual difficulties limited admissibility can create. The discussion will
reveal that the law is ambivalent about limited admissibility, a doctrine that
appears both indispensable and potentially ineffectual. Part III of the paper
will examine in more detail Canadian courts' approach to
limited-admissibility issues, which exemplifies this ambivalence. In Part IV,
the analysis turns to some proposals for rationalizing the
limited-admissibility analysis. I will argue that courts addressing
limited-admissibility issues should accept the legitimacy ofjury fact-finding,
aspire to apply rules that are realistic from a psychological point ofview, and
focus on the policies underlying evidentiary rules. Ultimately, I will offer two
concrete suggestions. First, courts should avoid limited admissibility where
possible by distinguishing between the permissible and impermissible uses of
evidence only when it is necessary to do so. Second, when limiting
instructions are needed, judges should consider the social-science research
and aim to design instructions that will be persuasive to juries.
II. LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
Limited admissibility refers primarily to situations where evidence in
question logically grounds more than one inference related to the material
issues, and is admissible to support one or more of these inferences, but also
inadmissible to support one or more of them. This phenomenon has been
called "purpose-oriented" limited admissibility, because the limitation
applies to the inferential purposes for which the evidence can be used.9 This
purpose-oriented form of limited admissibility will be the focus of the
8 Such an analysis is arguably long overdue, since Canadian legal literature has thus far
grappled with problems of limited admissibility almost exclusively in discrete doctrinal
contexts. See e.g. the discussion of particular rules of limited admissibility in Owen M
Rees, "The Jury's Propensity for Prohibited Reasoning: Corbett Revisited" (2002) 7:1
Can Crim L Rev 333.
9 Leonard, Wigmore, supra note 1, ch I at 13.
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analysis in this paper, but it is worth noting that limited admissibility can
also arise in other situations. For example, evidence may be admissible against
one party and not another party to the litigation."o The common theme in all
situations of limited admissibility is that the fact-finder is not free to
consider the evidence for every material issue to which it is relevant. Rather,
limited-admissibility rules seek to constrain the evaluation of evidence and
block the fact-finder from engaging in impermissible reasoning.
A. A FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE
This section will show that limited admissibility forms a part of the basic
structure of evidence law in the common-law tradition. Conceptually, the
potential for limited admissibility inheres in our purpose-driven
understanding of admissibility and exclusionary rules. In practice,
limited-admissibility rules have become a ubiquitous form of
evidentiary regulation.
1. LINK WITH EXCLUSIONARY RULES
Exclusionary rules lie at the heart of evidence law." Evidence can be ruled
inadmissible on a variety of grounds, and the nature, scope, and wisdom of
such exclusionary standards remains a central preoccupation of evidence
scholars." In discussing exclusionary rules, one falls easily into the shorthand
of describing certain "types" of evidence as admissible or inadmissible, but
this shorthand can be misleading. In fact, admissibility questions must be
decided in the context of particular cases because admissibility is purpose
driven. No admissibility issue can be decided without determining, first, the
o See e.g. Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst,supra note I at 74; Leonard, Wigmore,supra note 1,
ch I at 13, 27-28 (discussing "party-oriented" limited admissibility).
" See e.g. R v Graat, [198212 SCR 819,144 DLR (3d) 267, DicksonJ ("[w]estartwith the
reality that the law of evidence is burdened with a large number of cumbersome rules,
with exclusions, and exceptions to the exclusions, and exceptions to the exceptions" at
835, cited to SCR).
" See e.g. Peter Murphy, "Evidence, Proof, and Facts: An Introductory Essay" in Peter
Murphy, ed, Evidence, Proof and Facts: A Book ofSources (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003) 1 (the law of evidence "is essentially exclusionary in nature" at 2).
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purpose for which the evidence is being called and, second, whether the
evidence is admissible for that purpose." A prominent example of this
purpose-driven analysis is the hearsay rule, which operates to exclude
out-of-court statements only when they are relied on to prove the truth of
their contents." In the hearsay context, as in many others, admissibility turns
on the inferential use to be made of the evidence."
The purpose-driven character of the admissibility analysis constitutes a
fundamental feature of our system of evidentiary regulation. '6 It also gives
rise to the doctrine of limited admissibility. The fact that exclusionary rules
only prohibit the use of evidence for particular purposes makes it possible for
evidence to be admissible for some purposes but inadmissible for other
purposes-a situation that frequently arises in practice.7 Emerging as it does
from the purpose-driven conception of admissibility that underlies
exclusionary rules, limited admissibility represents an inherent structural
feature of evidence law.'
' See Leonard, Wigmore,supra note 1, ch I at 2. See alsoJohn Henry Wigmore,Evidencein
Trials at Common Law, revised ed by Peter Tillers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983) vol 1
("when an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose and becomes admissible. .. in that
capacity, it is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some
other capacity and because the jury might improperly consider it in the latter
capacity" at 694).
4 See especially R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 SCR 787 [Kbelawon] ("[tlhe
purpose for which the out-of-court statement is tendered matters in defining what
constitutes hearsay because it is only when the evidence is tendered to prove the truth of
its contents that the need to test its reliability arises" at para 36).
' See e.g. Richard D Friedman, "General Editor's Introduction to the Volume: Limitation
on Admissibility and Rationales for Exclusion" in Leonard, Wigmore, supra note 1
[Friedman, "Intro"} (hearsay is an example of the proposition that "[m]ost exclusionary
rules provide in effect that a given type of evidence is not admissible to prove a particular
type of proposition or to operate by a particular type of reasoning" at xxxviii).
11 See Wigmore, supra note 13 ("the entire structure of the modern law ofevidence rests on
the specialized and limited use of evidence" at 695, n 1).
'7 See ibid ("[i]n practical application this doctrine is constantly exemplified" at 694).
18 See Daniel D Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls, Limited Admissibility, and Rule 703" (2007)
76:3 Fordham L Rev 1229 [Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls"] ("the doctrine [of limited
admissibility] is structural, forming the core of modern evidence law" at 1239).
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Moreover, because limiting instructions formally acknowledge the
improper purposes for which evidence may not be used, offering such
instructions reaffirms exclusionary rules.'I Beyond its obvious function of
attempting to constrain the fact-finder's use of evidence, limited
admissibility also benefits the party against whom the evidence is led in two
important ways: First, when evidence is admitted for limited purposes, the
parties are bound to confine their arguments to the permissible uses of the
evidence.2 0 Second, just as outright exclusion of evidence can lead to the
collapse of a case, limited-admissibility rules can ground judgment against a
party as a matter oflaw (on a motion for nonsuit or directed verdict) where
the impermissible use of the evidence constitutes the only proof of an
essential fact.2 In short, the doctrine of limited admissibility both flows
from and complements our system of exclusionary rules.
2. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS
Given that judges must continually distinguish the permissible and
impermissible uses ofevidence, it seems natural that theyshould have devised
a mechanism for admitting evidence for permissible purposes only. After all,
the alternatives are unappealing: excluding the evidence altogether would
mean losing its value for the proper purpose, while admitting the evidence
without any limitation would prejudice the party against whom an improper
inference might be drawn.2 Where an item of evidence grounds multiple
inferences, the doctrine oflimited admissibility promises to relieve judges of
' See Friedman, "Intro", supra note 15 ("limitations on admissibility would erode if the
instructions were not given" at xlii).
20 See Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls", supra note 18 at 1234; Leonard, Wigmore,supra note 1, ch
1 at 87; Blinka, "Delusion", supra note 3 (in that sense, "the doctrine of limited
admissibility is as much a 'lawyer control device'as it is a jury control device" at 785).
2 See e.g. Friedman, "Intro" supra note 15 at xxxix.
2 See e.g. ibid (courts have three choices where evidence grounds proper and improper
inferences, "(1) exclude the evidence altogether, (2) admit it subject to a limiting
instruction, and (3) admit it without restraint" at xli).
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having to make a stark choice between these unattractive alternatives.13 The
main difficulty with limited admissibility lies not in the theory ofseparating
the permissible and impermissible uses of evidence, but with doing so in
practice-particularly in jury trials. The procedural mechanism generally
employed to enforce limited admissibility is a limiting instruction to the jury.
In the United States, limiting instructions are identified as the ordinary
remedy for limited-admissibility problems under Rule 105 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence." US judges routinely offer limiting instructions in
relation to a wide variety ofevidence problems, including relevancy, hearsay,
the use of a witness's prior inconsistent statements, and the admission of
otherwise inadmissible materials to explain the basis for an expert's
opinion.' American law recognizes that limited-use evidence must be
excluded entirely in rare circumstances where the prejudicial effect of the
evidence is exceptionally high, and limiting instructions cannot control the
risk of misuse. 7 Overwhelmingly, however, American courts adopt the view
23 See Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls",supra note 18 at 1233; Richard D Friedman, "Anchors and
Flotsam: Is Evidence Law 'Adrift?", Book Review ofEvidence LawAdrift by Mirjan R
Damaika (1998) 107:6 Yale LJ 1921 (limited admissibility springs from "unwillingness
to be confined to two unpalatable choices: unduly restricting the information available to
the factfinder, on the one hand, or abandoning altogether the impulse behind the
exclusionary rule, on the other" at 1932).
24 See Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls" supra note 18 (while admitting evidence for limited
purposes "strikes one as eminently reasonable on its face, the doctrine of limited
admissibility is unsettled by its procedural features" at 1233).
2s "If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose-but not
against another party or foranother purpose-the court, on timely request, must restrict
the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly": Fed R Evid 105. Most
of the states have adopted the rule verbatim or in substance. See Leonard, Wigmoresupra
note 1, ch I at 11.
26 The limited admissibility aspect of these evidence problems is discussed in Blinka,
"Ethical Firewalls" supra note 18.
27 See especially Bruton v United States, 391 US 123 (1968) [Bruton) (limiting instructions
were not adequate to protect the defendant and exclusion was constitutionally required
for the "powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements ofa codefendant" at 135). See
also Wigmore, supra note 13 ("[wlhile trial courts may exclude evidence admissible for a
limited purpose because of the danger that the jury may use the evidence for an improper
purpose, many appellate courts stress... that [this] ... is a drastic remedy" at 701).
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implicit in the Federal Rules of Evidence that instructions represent an
adequate solution for limited-admissibility problems."
The Canadian courts have taken a similar approach, albeit in a different
doctrinal setting. Canadian evidence law emerges mainly from case law and
does not contain any codified general approach to limited admissibility
analogous to Rule 105 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. But the Supreme
Court of Canada has repeatedly held that limited-admissibility problems
should normally be addressed using limiting instructions.29 Like their
American counterparts, trial judges in Canada have discretion to exclude
evidence when its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value,30 and this
discretion can sometimes be used to exclude altogether evidence that would
otherwise be admitted for limited purposes. However, in the great majority
of cases where limited admissibility arises, courts admit the evidence and
trust the judge or jury to use the evidence only as permitted. Examples ofthis
approach abound in the Canadian cases."
The best-known limited-admissibility rule in Canadian law pertains to
the use of the accused's criminal record under R v Corbett." Where the
28 Fed REvid 105. See Wigmore, ibid at 697; Leonard, Wigmoresupra note 1, ch I at 40;
Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls", supra note 18 at 1234.
2 See e.g. Corbett, supra note 5 (in the "many situations where the jury is permitted to hear
and use evidence relevant to one issue, but not to another... .all that is required is a clear
direction to the jury indicating what is permissible use and what is not" at 694); R vStarr,
(2000) SCC 40, [2000] 2 SCR 144 [Starr] ("when a piece of evidence may conceivably
be put to both proper and improper uses, the trial judge in a criminal case must give the
jury a limiting instruction regarding the permissible inferences that may be drawn from
the evidence" at para 184).
" See R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme, [1991] 2 SCR 577 at 611, 83 DLR (4th) 193 (judges
generally have the power to exclude evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighs its
probative value, but the discretion is narrower in respect ofdefence evidence, which may
only be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value).
" See e.g. Donald G Casswell, "Through theAdmissibility ofEvidence Maze: An Attempt
at a Purposive Structuring" (1991) 29:3 Alta L Rev 584 at 613-14 (Canadian evidence
rules that require limiting instructions include the hearsay rule, prior-conviction evidence,
prior inconsistent statements, character evidence and similar facts, and statements
by co-accused).
2 Supra note 5. For a detailed discussion of Corbett, see Part III.A, below.
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accused testifies, courts most often admit the record but instruct the jury to
consider it only as evidence going to the accused's credibility and not as
evidence of the accused's propensity to commit the offence." Courts also
invoke limited admissibility in contexts that are more obscure. For instance,
an accused person's refusal to participate in a police lineup for the purposes
ofidentification may be admissible to explain why the police failed to hold a
lineup, but remains inadmissible to prove guilt.M
Another fruitful source of limited-admissibility issues in Canadian law is
the hearsay rule, which operates to exclude only those out-of-court
statements offered to prove the truth of their contents." The distinction
between hearsay and non-hearsay purposes of evidence has generated a
seemingly endless variety of limited-admissibility rules. Where a witness's
testimony conflicts with his or her prior statements about events, those prior
statements are usually admissible only for the limited purpose ofimpeaching
his or her credibility and not for their truth." Prior statements consistent
with a witness's testimony are inadmissible to confirm the truth of the
testimony, but may be admitted for other purposes: for instance, they may
rebut an allegation that the witness recently fabricated the story," or
otherwise give context for assessing the witness's credibility." When the
defence claims that the police investigation ofan offence was inadequate, the
Crown may be entitled to lead evidence ofwhat various witnesses told police
during the investigation. Where admissible, such "investigative hearsay""
1 Corbett does recognize the trial judge's discretion to exclude the accused witness's record
in some cases. This discretion is discussed in greater detail in Part IIA, below.
3 See Rv Henry, 2010 BCCA 462 at para 50, 79 CR (6th) 341, applying Rv Marcoux
(1975), [1976] 1 SCR763,60 DLR (3d) 119.
35 See Khelawon, supra note 14 at para 36.
3 See R v B (KG), [1993] 1 SCR 740, 19 CR (4th) 1 (recognizing exceptions to the
"orthodox rule that prior inconsistent statements are admissible only to impeach the
credibility of a witness, and not as evidence of the truth of their contents" at
755, cited to SCR).
Rv Stirling, 2008 SCC 10 at para 5, [2008] 1 SCR 272 [Stirling].
3 R vDinardo, 2008 SCC 24 at para 39, [20081 1 SCR788 [Dinardo].
3 Rv Van, 2009 SCC 22 at paras 32-33, [20091 1 SCR 716.
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must be accompanied by a limiting instruction explaining that the
information should be considered solely to develop the narrative of the
investigation and not for its truth.40
The limited-admissibility rules catalogued above have all been approved
by the Supreme Court of Canada. The list is by no means exhaustive, but it is
sufficient to reveal how thoroughly the doctrine of limited admissibility
permeates Canadian evidence law. Limiting instructions are offered so
frequently and in connection with such a variety of evidence doctrines that
one can scarcely imagine our system ofevidentiary regulation without them.
This proliferation of limited-admissibility rules-together with the
conceptual link between limited admissibility and rules of
exclusion-indicates that limited admissibility holds a foundational place in
our law of evidence.
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
However indispensable limited-admissibility rules appear from a legal
standpoint, they seem unworkable from a psychological perspective. The law
rests on the premise that juries abide by limiting instructions and use
evidence for proper purposes only. That premise is grounded, in turn, on
three propositions, each ofwhich appears open to question: First, in order to
follow limiting instructions, juries must understand them. Second, juries
must be motivated to try to respect the limitations imposed by the court.
Third, even when juries understand and are motivated to follow limiting
instructions, they must be psychologically capable ofcontrolling the impact
of the evidence on their decision-making processes. The idea that juries have
the necessary comprehension, motivation, and psychological ability to abide
by limiting instructions seems dubious as a matter of common sense.4" One
4 Ibid.
' SeeJudith LRitter, "YourLipsAre Moving... But the WordsAren't Clear: Dissecting the
Presumption thatJurors Understand Instructions" (2004) 69 Mo L Rev 163 ("given the
legalistic wording of most jury instructions, common sense would suggest that ... lay
persons would have great difficulty in understanding them" at 164); Blinka, "Delusion",
supra note 3 (it is "intuitively obvious ... that limiting instructions ... cannot ...
effectively control the minds and thought processes of jurors" at 809).
VOL 46:2250
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suspects, for example, that lay jurors would have difficulty comprehending
the legal distinctions drawn by limited-admissibility rules, such as the
notoriously difficult distinction between hearsay and non-hearsay.42 As the
discussion in this section will reveal, empirical research into jury psychology
supports these common sense doubts.
Ofcourse, limited-admissibility rules apply both in jury trials and in trials
by judge alone. The present focus on jury psychology should not obscure the
fact that both judges and juries probably lack the psychological ability to
direct their mental processes strictly in accordance with limited-admissibility
rules.43 One might doubt whether any decision maker could be entirely
faithful to a requirement to consider evidence for some but not other
relevant purposes. 4 However, their legal training and professional role
provide assurances that judges understand and try to uphold the distinctions
between permissible and impermissible uses of evidence.45 By contrast, one
might fairly question not only juries'psychological ability to follow limiting
instructions but also their understanding of these instructions and their
motivation to abide by them. Thus, while limited admissibility raises
concerns in both bench and jury trials, the ultimate test of any limited
admissibility rule is whether it will be faithfully applied by a jury.
42 See Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls", supra note 18 at 1244 (deriding the "fantastical" notion
that jurors understand the difference between hearsay and non-hearsay uses of evidence
on the basis of a brief instruction).
43 What little research has been done on judges suggests that they too draw impermissible
inferences from evidence. One study of US judges who filled out questionnaires based on
written trial summaries found that "judges do not disregard inadmissible information
when making substantive decisions in either civil or criminal cases": AndrewJ Wistrich,
Chris Guthrie &JeffreyJ Rachlinski, "Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding" (2005) 153:4 U Pa L Rev 1251 at 1323.
4 See e.g. Leonard, Wigmore, supra note 1, ch 1 ("[b]ecause judges do not shed their natural
human tendencies when they ascend to the bench, there will be times when they will not
be able to cast aside evidence of logical value even though it is inadmissible as a matter of
legal policy" at 34); Damaika,supra note I at 32 (both judges and juries are susceptible to
impermissible propensity reasoning on the basis of bad character evidence).
4 See Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 43 at 1256 (judges are probably more
motivated than jurors to ignore inadmissible evidence because they understand and are
committed to the policies behind evidentiary rules).
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Moreover, enforcement problems with limited-admissibility rules are
particularly acute in jury trials. In bench trials, judges "instruct themselves"
on limited-admissibility rules. Where ajudge fails to appreciate a distinction
between permissible or impermissible uses ofevidence, or where the reasons
reveal that the judge used the evidence for an impermissible purpose, these
errors may ground an appeal."Juries, on the other hand, do not give reasons,
so their actual use of evidence cannot be reviewed. The law must depend
entirely on the prophylactic effect of the judge's instructions. Gauging the
effectiveness of the limiting instructions given to juries therefore takes on
special urgency, and it is to this question that the analysis now turns.
1. EMPIRICAL DOUBTS ABOUT LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS
A substantial body of psychological research sheds light on the operation of
limiting instructions. These findings must be generalized with caution to the
Canadian courtroom setting, since the studies are largely American and
frequently employ trial simulation methods that do not closely parallel the
experience of actual jurors.47 While generalizing American studies to other
jurisdictions can be hazardous," the similarities between Canadian and
American approaches to limited admissibility suggest that American studies
can shed light on the Canadian legal system.49 And despite the differences
46 See e.g. Dinardo, supra note 38.
4 See especially David DeMatteo & Natalie Anumba, "The Validity of Jury Decision-
Making Research" in Joel D Lieberman & Daniel A Krauss, eds,Jury Psychology: Social
Aspects of Trial Processes; Psychology in the Courtroom, Volume I (Surrey, UK: Ashgate,
2009) 1 (there is a "lingering concern that research studies involving college students
pretending to be jurors in a trial that consists entirely of brief written summaries do not
yield information that is relevant to and predictive of the behaviour ofactual jurors in an
actual trial" at 12).
48 See ibid at 5.
' Moreover, some of the leading studies on the effects of criminal-record evidence are
actually Canadian. See AN Doob & HM Kirshenbaum, "Some Empirical Evidence on
the Effect ofs. 12 ofthe Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused" (1973) 15 Crim LQ88;
Valerie P Hans & Anthony Doob, "Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the
Deliberations of Simulated Juries" (1975) 18 Crim LQ 235 at 242. These studies are
often cited by American scholars as relevant to that legal system. See e.g. Joel D
Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, "Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social
252 VOL 46:2
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between the courtroom and laboratory settings, currently available evidence
suggests that jury simulation studies generate useful results."o Moreover,
confidence in the generalizability of research findings should increase as
results are consistently replicated with a number of different research designs,
and especially as meta-analytic studies emerge." Many of the findings
bearing on limiting instructions have been confirmed in these ways.
Ultimately, the psychological findings should be of interest to lawyers
because they provide the best available information about the effects of
evidence rules on jury decision making.
A review of the research on limiting instructions raises a problem of
terminology. The phrase "limiting instructions" is sometimes used to denote
instructions to consider evidence for some permissible purposes while
ignoring it for other, impermissible purposes-a true situation of limited
admissibility. Unfortunately, the psychological literature frequently employs
the phrase more broadly to encompass any instruction that purports to
restrict the fact-finder's use of evidence, including instructions to disregard
inadmissible evidence that may not be used for any purpose. " In this paper,
the term "limiting instructions" is used narrowly to denote instructions on
the limited use of evidence. Instructions to disregard evidence are treated
separately. When referring collectively to limiting instructions and
instructions to disregard, this paper employs the term "admonitions"."
Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity
and Other Inadmissible Evidence" (2000) 6:3 Psychol Pub Pol'y & L 677 at 686.
5 DeMatteo & Anumba, supra note 47 ("[t]he safest conclusion may be that jury
decision-making research is potentially of high value to the discerning consumer of
research" at 15).
" See e.g. ibid at 19.
52 For an example of this broad use of the term "limiting instructions", see Lieberman &
Arndt, supra note 49 at 686. A plurality of the Supreme Court ofCanada recently defined
limiting instructions in this broad sense in White, supra note 2 ("[t]he purpose of a
limiting instruction is to preclude the jury from considering certain evidence, either with
respect to all the live issues in a case or with respect to one or more particular live issues"
at para 28).
* This taxonomy is borrowed fromJ Alexander Tanford, "The Law and Psychology ofJury
Instructions" (1990) 69 Neb L Rev 71 ("[a]dmonitions are given ... in an effort to
prevent jurors from misusing potentially prejudicial information.... They come in two
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On the whole, the existing empirical research suggests that admonitions
frequently fail to control the fact-finder's use of evidence.54 In fact,
admonitions sometimes produce a "backfire effect" whereby instructions to
disregard or use evidence for limited purposes induce fact-finders to focus
more attention on the evidence than they would have without the
instructions." These overall trends in the empirical findings
are disconcerting.16
Instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence have been studied
extensively. This body of research has important implications for those
interested in the effectiveness oflimiting instructions because ifjurors cannot
ignore inadmissible information when they are told to do so, there is little
reason to be confident in their ability to perform the more delicate mental
task of considering evidence only for limited purposes. A recent
meta-analysis examined 48 studies on the effects of various forms of
inadmissible evidence on mock jurors.17 The meta-analysis did not
distinguish between types of admonitions, so a few studies of limiting
instructions were included alongside numerous studies of instructions to
disregard." Overall, the meta-analysis showed that being exposed to
main varieties: admonitions that jurors must completely disregard information and
instructions to limit their use of evidence" at 76).
5 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 49 at 686; Joel D Lieberman, Jamie Arndt & Matthew
Vess, "Inadmissible Evidence and Pretrial Publicity: The Effects (and Ineffectivenss) of
Admonitions to Disregard" in Lieberman & Krauss, supra note 47, 67 at 80.
5 See e.g. Lieberman,Arndt & Vess, ibid ("judicial instructions to disregard or limit the use
of inadmissible evidence are frequently unsuccessful.... [They] can also paradoxically
focus jurors'attention to the inadmissible information and thus amplify its impact on
legal decisions" at 80); Dennis J Devine et al, "Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of
Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups" (2001) 7:3 Psychol Pub Pol'y & L 622
(admonitions "have proven to be ineffective and have even been associated with a
paradoxical increase in the targeted behaviour" at 666).
5 See Lieberman, Arndt & Vess, supra note 54 at 80.
1 Nancy Steblay et al, "The Impact on Juror Verdicts ofJudicial Instruction to Disregard
Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis" (2006) 30:4 Law & Hum Behav 469.
5' For example, the meta-analysis included the two Canadian studies cited at supra note 49
on the effects of instructions to limit the use of evidence of the accused's criminal record.
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inadmissible evidence affects verdicts." In particular, guilty verdicts reliably
increased when mock jurors were exposed to inadmissible evidence favouring
the prosecution.60 Furthermore, the effects of inadmissible evidence on
fact-finders were not successfully corrected by judicial admonitions.' In
general, then, the research suggests that jurors may be unable or unwilling to
disregard information they perceive as relevant to the issues before them.
The existing research on limiting instructions centres on criminal-record
evidence. Studies in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada
have examined the effects of instructions to consider an accused's criminal
record only on the issue of credibility and not as evidence of propensity to
commit the offence. An early Canadian study by Doob and Kirshenbaum
examined mock-juror verdicts on the basis of a brief written trial summary
that either included or did not include the fact that the accused had a record
of five convictions for the very offence charged (breaking and entering).6 1 In
that 1973 study, knowledge of the criminal record increased the likelihood
that mock jurors would find the accused guilty, and limiting instructions had
no effect." Another early Canadian study by Hans and Doob set out to
replicate these results with deliberating mock juries." In that 1975 study,
mock jurors read a short summary of a burglary trial and deliberated in
groups to arrive at a verdict. The trial summary was varied so the accused
59 Steblay et al, supra note 57 at 486.
6 Ibid (" [l]cvel of guilty verdicts increases with pro-prosecution evidence .... The average
effect is small ... but reliable").
61 Ibid ("when inadmissible evidence does make a significant impression on jurors, a
corrective judicial admonition does not fully eliminate the impact").
62 See Lieberman, Arndt & Vess, supra note 54 ("[i]n general, this research indicates that
jurors are often biased by such information, and that even concerted efforts to ignore it
may fail, especially when the information is viewed as highly relevant" at 76); Devine,
supra note 55 ("jurors are unwilling (or unable) to set aside information that appears
relevant to determiningwhat happened-regardless ofwhat the law (and thus the judge)
has to say about it" at 666).
63 Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 49.
64 Ibid ("[t]he 'judge's instructions' had no effect whatsoever on the decisions by
the subjects" at 95).
65 Hans & Doob, supra note 49.
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either did or did not have a conviction for burglary, and jurors either were or
were not instructed to limit their use of the record to credibility and not
guilt. Mock juries who knew of the accused's prior conviction viewed the
evidence against the accused as stronger and were significantly more likely to
convict the accused," regardless of any limiting instruction.'
Researchers testing the impact oflimiting instructions face the challenge
of assessing whether any effect of limited-use evidence on verdicts has
occurred through permissible or impermissible reasoning. In the
criminal-record context, for example, the mere fact that guilty verdicts
increase when a criminal record is present does not indicate any impropriety
in the mock jurors'reasoning. As long as jurors reason through the accused's
credibility and not through propensity, the increase in guilty verdicts is
consistent with the applicable limited-admissibility rule. The Doob and
Kirshenbaum study described above was designed to separate the effects of
reasoning through the accused's credibility from forbidden propensity
reasoning: the trial summary indicated that the accused's testimony did not
touch on any important issues, so the accused's credibility was not really in
question. The authors concluded that the increase in guilty verdicts flowing
from the criminal record could be attributed to improper propensity
reasoning." Subsequent studies have refined methods for isolating the
permissible and impermissible effects of limited-use evidence.
A 1985 American study by Wissler and Saks tested the impact of an
accused's criminal record and limiting instructions on mock jurors'
judgments.69 Subjects read a brief case summary before assessing both the
accused's credibility and his guilt. Versions of the case varied on the issue of
the accused's criminal record: either no record was mentioned, the accused
had a prior conviction on the same charge, or the accused had a prior
conviction on a dissimilar charge. The results indicated that mock jurors did
" Ibid at 242, 244, 251.
6 Ibid at 252.
6 Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 49 at 94-95.
69 Roselle LWissler & MichaelJ Saks, "On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When
Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt" (1985) 9:1 Law&
Hum Behav 37.
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not abide by limiting instructions. Changing the information about the
accused's criminal record had no effect on mock jurors' credibility
judgments,70 but it did affect conviction rates.71 The accused was least likely
to be convicted when no prior record was mentioned and most likely to be
convicted when he had a prior conviction for the same charge.72 The authors
concluded that mock jurors used the criminal record not for the permissible
purpose of gauging the accused's credibility but for the impermissible
purpose of assessing the accused's propensity to commit the offence.73
Subjects'use of the prior record defied the instructions they were given on
the limited use of the evidence. 4
Another study on prior convictions was published in 2000 by
Lloyd-Bostock. This English study used a sophisticated video trial simulation
with several variations in terms of current charge and criminal record.75
Consistent with previous research, the mock jurors judged the accused most
likely to be guilty when he had a recent conviction on a similar charge.7The
study also measured mock jurors' assessments of several dimensions of the
accused's character and credibility, and these measures supported the
7" Ibid ("[t]he defendant's credibility is already so much lower than that of the other
witnesses... that the admission ofprior convictions does not reduce the credibilityofthe
defendant further" at 43). But see Michele Cox & Sarah Tanford, "Effects of Evidence
and Instructions in Civil Trials: An Experimental Investigation of Rules ofAdmissibility"
(1989) 4 Social Behaviour 31 ("[o]ur findings are discrepant from the study by Wissler
and Saks. . . . We have consistently obtained effects on credibility for limited-use
evidence" at 52).
71 Wissler & Saks, supra note 69 at 43.
72 Ibid.
7 Ibid at 47.
74 Ibid ("[p]eople's decision processes do not employ the prior-conviction evidence in the
way the law wishes them to use it"). See also Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, "The
Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision Making" (1995) 19:1 Law & Hum
Behav 67 (mock-juror study of effects of prior convictions and acquittals in which
"limiting instructions had little effect on jurors'use of this evidence" at 76).
7 Sally Lloyd-Bostock, "The Effects on Juries of HearingAbout the Defendant's Previous
Criminal Record: A Simulation Study" (2000) Crim L Rev 734.
76 Ibid at 742. To a similar effect, see the results of the LSEJury Project, reported inAP Sealy
& WR Cornish, "Juries and the Rules of Evidence" (1973) Crim L Rev 208 at 217.
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conclusion that the accused's record affected subjects' decisions through
forbidden propensity reasoning and not through credibility.7 Tellingly, for
example, no matter what offence was charged, an accused with a prior
conviction for indecent assault on a child was perceived as the least
believable, the most likely to be guilty, and the most likely to lie in court.' It
appears that mock jurors made a general negative judgment about an accused
with a record for this offence, suggesting that evidence of such a previous
conviction can be gravely prejudicial." As in the studies discussed above,
there was no evidence that mock jurors abided by the limiting instructions
they were given on the permissible purposes of criminal-record evidence."o
One limitation of the existing body of research on the effect of limiting
instructions is that the studies all focus on evidence of an accused's criminal
record. The heavy prejudice associated with such criminal-record evidence
may make limiting instructions particularly difficult to follow in this context.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the existing research casts serious doubt on
the efficacy of limiting instructions.
There is also a chance that limiting instructions may backfire. The
"backfire effect" of admonitions was first observed and has most often been
replicated in the context of instructions to disregard evidence; often, such
instructions prompt research subjects to rely more heavily on the
inadmissible evidence than they would without the admonition." The
7 Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 75 at 748.
78 Ibid.
7 Ibid at 753.
s Ibid (jurors were instructed that the criminal-record information was "not relevant at all
to the likelihood ofhis having committed the offence .... It is relevant only as to whether
you can believe him" at 735).
An early demonstration ofthe backfire effect for disregard instructions appears in Sharon
Wolf & David A Montgomery, "Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial
Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of MockJurors" (1977) 7:3 Journal of
Applied Social Psychology 205 (the biasing effect of inadmissible information was
eliminated when jurors were simply told it was inadmissible; however, when "the judge
went on to specifically admonish the mock jurors to disregard the inadmissible testimony,
the bias was not significantly reduced" at 216). See also Lieberman & Arndt, supra note
49 (reviewing research indicating that "admonitions to disregard evidence may not only
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existing research provides some support for the notion that limiting
instructions can also backfire. One mock jury study based on a video
re-enactment ofa civil negligence trial found that when limited-use evidence
was led against the defendant, "limiting instructions actually increased
liability".12 However, the influence of the limited-use evidence and the effect
of limiting instructions depended on the type of evidence presented."
Research on this question is underdeveloped, but one cannot ignore the
possibility that limiting instructions might perversely increase the jury's
use of forbidden reasoning."
Psychologists have posited several explanations for the backfire effect.
The most obvious explanation turns on salience: the simple act of drawing
attention to evidence by way of an admonition may increase the probability
that jurors will be influenced by it, properly or improperly." A second
explanation for the backfire effect comes from a psychologicaltheoryknown
as "reactance", which refers to a state of psychological arousal that occurs
when people perceive a threat to their ability to act freely. 6 Individuals
experiencing reactance sometimes try to reassert their freedom by engaging
in the targeted behaviour. 87 Reactance theory can explain the backfire effect
because ifjurors perceive judicial admonitions as threats to their deliberative
freedom, they may engage in prohibited reasoning in an attempt to assert
be ineffective in many situations but may serve to focus jurors'attention on inadmissible
evidence and increase their reliance on it in their decision making" at 691).
82 Cox & Tanford, supra note 70 at 51.
3 Ibid ("[l]imiting instructions increased negative defendant impressions for other-acts
evidence, and reduced them somewhat for similar-happenings evidence.... [Thus] a
biased inference process does occur for limited-use evidence, although the extent of this
bias depends on the particular trait or behavioural information that is provided").
8 For commentary suggesting that limiting instructions can produce backfire effects,
see supra note 55.
85 See e.g. Lisa Eichhorn, "Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard
Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence" (1989) 52:4 Law & Contemp Probs 341
("the 'fuss'that was made in objecting to the evidence and in ruling on its admissibility
seemed to indicate to jurors that the [evidence] had a particular importance" at 344).
86 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 49 at 693.
7 Ibid at 694.
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their freedom to determine independently the import of the evidence." A
third explanation for the backfire effect involves "ironic processes of mental
control"," whereby efforts to ignore information make the information more
cognitively accessible."
These three explanations are not mutually exclusive; all may play a part in
accounting for occurrences of the backfire effect. Reactance theory best
explains the effect in situations where jurors lack motivation to abide by
admonitions, while ironic mental control theory best explains backfire
effects when jurors try to follow the judge's instructions.9' The unfortunate
result is that admonitions may backfire either way.92 Taken together, the
psychological literature on limiting instructions, disregard instructions, and
the backfire effect casts grave doubt on the efficacy of admonitions. This
psychological critique calls into question the courts' reliance on limiting
instructions to enforce the doctrine of limited admissibility.
2. AREAS OF PROMISE
While the general picture appears gloomy, social scientists have identified
some factors that seem to make admonitions more effective." To the extent
that jurors fail to follow admonitions because they don't understand them,"
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid at 697.
* Ibid at 698.
Ibid at 702-03.
9 Ibid ("juxtaposition of the two theories suggests a rather soberingview of the effectiveness
of limiting instructions" at 702).
93 See Linda J Demaine, "Realizing the Potential of Instructions to Disregard" in Lynn
Nadel & Walter P Sinnott-Armstrong, eds,MemoryandLaw (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012) 185 ("[e]mpirical studies paint a grim picture of the effectiveness of
instructions to disregard. . . . [But some] contrary findings suggest that certain
characteristics in the content and delivery of instructions to disregard can render them
more or less effective" at 186).
9 SeeJoel D Lieberman & Bruce D Sales, "What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury
Instruction Process" (1997) 3:4 Psychol Pub Pol'y & Law 589 at 596 (comprehension
problems account in part for jurors failing to follow judicial instructions).
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simplifying the language of instructions can enhance their effectiveness.
Comprehension problems seem particularly likely to arise with limiting
instructions, which explain the conceptually challenging distinctions
between the permissible and impermissible uses ofevidence." The available
evidence suggests that comprehension can be improved to some degree by
rewriting instructions according to psycho-linguistic principles." Another
factor that appears to improve jurors'compliance with admonitions is group
deliberation. Many of the studies that cast doubt on the efficacy of limiting
instructions were conducted with individual mock jurors, and some
empirical evidence has emerged that deliberation enhances the effectiveness
of admonitions. 7
Innovations in the timing of instructions also hold some promise for
improving jury compliance. For example, forewarning juries that they might
be exposed to inadmissible or prejudicial information may make them better
able to control their response to such information when it is presented.98
Finally, a number of studies have shown that jurors are more likely to abide
by instructions to disregard when judges explain why the evidence should be
ignored.99 These findings raise the intriguing possibility-to be discussed
further below' 00-that admonitions, including limiting instructions, can be
" Ibid at 600-01.
96 See e.g. ibid at 609, 623; Tanford, supra note 53 at 80-82; Laurence J Severance &
Elizabeth F Loftus, "Improving the Ability ofJurors to Comprehend andApply Criminal
Jury Instructions" (1982) 17:1 Law & Soc'y Rev 153 (mock-juror study finding that
"psycholinguistic changes in pattern instructions can improve jurors' abilities to both
comprehend and apply jury instructions" at 194).
9 See the mock-jury studies reported in Kamala London & Narina Nunez, "The Effect of
Jury Deliberations on Jurors'Propensity to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence" (2000) 85:6
Journal of Applied Psychology 932 ("the process of deliberation lessened the biasing
impact of inadmissible evidence" at 935); Jeffrey Kerwin & David Shaffer, "MockJurors
Versus MockJuries: The Role of Deliberations in Reactions to Inadmissible Testimony"
(1994) 20 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 153 ("[m]embers of deliberating
juries were... more likely than individual (nondeliberating) jurors to adhere to ajudicial
ruling that they disregard inadmissible information" at 159).
9' See e.g. Tanford, supra note 53 at 108.
9 See especially the meta-analysis of Steblay et al, supra note 57 at 487.
" See Part IV.B.2.
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made more effective by incorporating a persuasive rationale. Taken together,
these factors offer some hope that the effectiveness of limiting instructions
can be enhanced through procedural innovation.
Psychological research yields insights into legal policy in the area of
limited admissibility. Asubstantial body ofempirical work casts doubt on the
ability oflimiting instructions to structure facr-finders'use ofevidence in the
way the law intends. The same body of research points to a few procedural
reforms that carry some potential to enhance the effectiveness of limiting
instructions. The effects of admonitions seem likely to depend on the type of
evidence and form of instruction, and future research may refine the
understanding of these factors."o' Ultimately, though, the psychological
research cannot solve the complex problem of limited admissibility. The
empirical data offer some clues, but judges and legislators must go on
implementing courtroom procedures in conditions of uncertainty about
their practical effects.
C. CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION
Fraught with difficulty from a psychological point of view, the doctrine of
limited admissibility also generates confusion at a conceptual level. The
permissible and impermissible uses of evidence are frequently so closely
aligned as to be difficult if not impossible to separate. When the law adopts
spurious distinctions between proper and improper inferences, the issue
becomes not whether juries actually understand and apply those distinctions
but whether they are even capable of being understood and applied.
The conceptual confusion surroundinglimited-admissibility rules can be
explained in part by the incentives of the adversary system. In theory,
limiting instructions aim to prevent juries from using evidence for improper
purposes while permitting them to use it for proper purposes. In reality, as
American scholar Daniel Blinka has pointed out, adversary lawyers may
invoke limited admissibility to evade exclusionary rules.o2 Because judges
decide questions of admissibility in jury trials, juries are normally insulated
'' See Steblay et al,supra note 57 at 488; Devine, supra note 55 at 687.
02 Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls". supra note 18 at 1237.
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from evidence excluded as inadmissible for all purposes.'o3 However, if an
advocate finds a permissible purpose for evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible, the doctrine oflimited admissibility applies, and, typically, the
evidence will be admitted subject to a limiting instruction. Thus, the
doctrine is vulnerable to manipulation by lawyers, who may argue that
evidence should be admitted for some proper purpose while hoping that the
limiting instruction will be ineffective and the jury will use the evidence for
an impermissible purpose.
What is more, since identifying a permissible purpose represents a ticket
to admission, adversary lawyers are motivated to find or invent such a
purpose for any otherwise inadmissible evidence that advances their case.'05
This incentive generates some untenable distinctions as lawyers work with
evidentiary concepts in an attempt to differentiate each prohibited use of
evidence from an ostensibly permissible purpose.Judges in their turn may be
enchanted by the sophistication of these fine distinctions or simply happy to
find a way to admit valuable evidence that would otherwise be subject to an
exclusionary rule." Either way, judges frequently rely on feeble distinctions
in applying limited-admissibility rules."0 In sum, according to Blinka's
103 See Damaika,supra note 1 (exclusionary rules are most effectively enforced injury trials
because the divided court protects the jury from being exposed to inadmissible
information, so "inadmissible but otherwise credible evidence leaves no imprint on the
fact finder's mind" at 47).
'0 See Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls", supra note 18 at 1238; Daniel DBlinka,"Ethics, Evidence,
and the Modern Adversary Trial" (2006) 19:1 Geo J Legal Ethics 1 [Blinka, "Ethics"]
("[1]imited admissibility allows the proponent to offer evidence ostensibly for a restricted
purpose (e.g., the declarant believed the black car ran the stop sign) yet with reasonable
confidence that the trier of fact will nonetheless use the evidence asit sees fit (e.g., in fact,
the black car ran the stop sign)" at 19).
105 See Blinka, "Ethics", ibid ("trial lawyers are motivated to expose the jury to whatever
information helps their case").
o'0 See e.g. Bruton, supra note 27 ("the limiting instruction, although not really capable of
preventing the jury from considering the prejudicial evidence, does as a matter of form
provide a way around the exclusionary rules of evidence that is defensible because it
'probably firthers, rather than impedes, the search for truth .. .. '" at 133, quoting from
Nash v United States, 54 F 2d 1006 at 1007 (2d Cir 1932) [Nash]).
'7 Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls" supra note 18 at 1238, 1241.
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scathing assessment, the doctrine of limited admissibility "invites abuse and
sharp practice by harbouring distinctions that are often questionable and
sometimes just plain meaningless." 0 8
D. THE LAW'S AMBIVALENCE
Judges are, of course, not unaware of the problems with limited-admissibility
rules. Some of the harshest criticisms oflimiting instructions have emanated
from common-law judges, especially in the United States. Judge Learned
Hand famously opined that limiting instructions ask the jury to perform "a
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's
else."'9 In a similar vein,Justice RobertJackson ofthe United States Supreme
Court pronounced "[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury . . . [an] unmitigated fiction.""o
Canadian judges have occasionally expressed similar sentiments."' For
instance, Justice Estey of the Supreme Court ridiculed the "offence against
common sense"" 2 of instructing the jury to consider a key witness's prior
statements about the material events only on the issue of the witness's
credibility and not as substantive evidence of what happened."' For
generations, then, certain voices from within the judiciary have questioned
the efficacy of limiting instructions.
Yet, for every judge who has criticized limiting instructions, many have
accepted the premise that juries can and do follow instructions to consider
108 Ibid at 1238.
'0 Nash, supra note 106 at 1007.
"o Krulewitch v United States, 336 US 440 at 453 (1949).
." For example, one judge harshly criticized limiting instructions in his extrajudicial
writings, arguing that the law wrongly "clings to the assumption that a trier of fact can
compartmentalize thinking": Brent Knazan, "Putting Evidence out ofYour Mind" (1999)
42:4 Crim LQ 501 at 509.
uz McInroy and Rouse v The Queen (1978), [1979) 1 SCR 588 at 606,89 DLR (3d) 609.
" Ibid (such a limiting instruction "lacks the ring of reality but is transparently a rule
adopted for comfort in the full awareness by the Court that regardless of the instructions
to the jury, the content of the prior inconsistent statement will be weighed by the jury...
in their findings or conclusions on the facts" at 620).
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evidence only for limited purposes. In both the United States and Canada,
courts operate on the basis of this premise," 4 which has been variously
described as a "presumption", "I a "legal fiction", "'6 "an exercise in faith","' and
a "judicial lie"."' Obviously, courts'reliance on this premise stands in tension
with the persistent doubts about the efficacy of limiting instructions. Some
judges and commentators have acknowledged this tension, admitting that
the law's stated confidence in limiting instructions represents less a true
article of faith than an imperfect but "practical accommodation" of
conflicting demands."' Other courts have taken a more defensive posture,
scorning criticisms ofjudicial instructions as insults to the system of trial by
114 Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, ScaliaJ recognized "the almost invariable
assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions": Richardson, Warden vMarsh,
481 US 200 at 206 (1987) [Richardson]. See also Leonard, Wigmore, supra note 1, ch 1 (a
review of the US cases reveals that "the law places significant faith in the ability and
willingness of the fact finder to ignore evidence inadmissible for particular purposes" at
88-6); Tanford, supra note 53 ("since the first studies demonstrating . . . (the]
ineffectiveness [of admonitions] were published in 1958, [US] appellate courts have
approved their use in approximately 21,000 cases-a ninety-five percent approval rate" at
95); Casswell, supra note 31 (Canadian "judges generally ... adhere to the traditional
wisdom that the trier of fact is able to and does follow even difficult instructions on the
limited use to which evidence may be put" at 612).
"1 On the "presumption" that juries follow judicial instructions generally, see Ritter, supra
note 41. US courts interpret this presumption sometimes as a fixed rule, and sometimes as
a rebuttable presumption (ibid at 174-77).
16 Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls", supra note 18 at 1234; Blinka, "Delusion"supra note 3 at 781.
117 Wigmore, supra note 13 at 696, n 1.
"8 Rees, supra note 8 ("[i]t is of absolutely no value to continue with the judicial lie that
juries when properly instructed by the judge do not reason through propensity" at 346).
"' Richardson, supra note 114, ScaliaJ (" [t]he rule that juries are presumed to follow their
instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption
is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the
interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process" at 211). See also
Wigmore, supra note 13 (the limited admissibility "doctrine, though involving certain
risks, is indispensable as a practical rule" at 694); Kenneth S Broun, ed, McCormick on
Evidence, vol 1, 6th ed (St Paul, Minn: West, 2006) ("[r]ealistically, the instruction may
not always be effective, but admission of the evidence with the limiting instruction is
normally the best reconciliation of the competing interests" at 296).
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jury. 12 These conflicting responses demonstrate the law's ambivalence
toward the fundamental but flawed doctrine of limited admissibility. The
next part of this paper will explore how this ambivalence plays out in
Canadian law.
III. LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY IN THE CANADIAN COURTS
The Supreme Court set the stage for the modern Canadian approach to
limited admissibility more than twenty years ago in R v Corbett.'2' In the
course of an inconclusive split opinion, the battle lines were drawn between
staunch defenders of limited admissibility and those with a more skeptical
view. This part will review Corbett's impact and the conflicting approaches to
limited admissibility that continue to find expression in Canadian law.
A. THE LEGACY OF CORBETT
The common law generally prohibits the prosecution from advancing
evidence of an accused's bad character-including any criminal record-to
show that the accused is the type of person likely to commit the offence. 122
However, section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act provides for the criminal
record of any witness to be admitted to go to the witness's credibility. 23
Before Corbett was decided in 1988, the courts interpreted section 12 as
mandatory and routinely admitted evidence of the criminal record of any
20 See e.g. White, supra note 2 (worries that a jury might draw irrational inferences from
post-offence conduct despite a proper instruction undermine the system's "conviction that
jurors are intelligent and reasonable fact finders" at para 56); Ritter, supra note 41
(frequently, US "courts subscribe to the notion that questioning the validity of this
presumption poses a threat to the survival of our system of justice" at 163).
.2. Supra note 5.
See especially ibid ("an individual is to be tried not for the kind of person he may be but
for the offence he may have committed" at 725).
123 See Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, s 12, which provides: "A witness may be
questioned as to whether the witness has been convicted ofany offence.... If the witness
either denies the fact or refuses to answer, the opposite party may prove the conviction."
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accused person who took the stand. 124 To guard against prejudice, judges
would instruct juries to confine their use of the record to the question of
credibility.125 The problem with this process was plain: it rested on the
dubious assumption that the limiting instruction would in fact prevent juries
from engaging in propensity reasoning.
The accused in Corbett was on trial for murder and he took the stand in
his own defence. The jury was informed of his criminal record, which
included an earlier conviction for murder. The accused was convicted and
ultimately brought an appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming that section 12
violated his right to a fair trial under the Canadian Charter ofRights and
Freedoms.'2 6 Corbett's appeal was unsuccessful; two separate opinions
together constituting a 5:1 majority ofthe Court concluded that the criminal
record had been properly admitted.27 Of greater interest to posterity, a
differently constituted 4:2 majority of the Court held that section 12 should
be interpreted as allowing trial judges discretion to exclude an accused
witness's criminal record where the limiting instruction would not
adequately safeguard the accused's fair trial rights. ChiefJustice Dickson,
124 See Corbett,supra note 5 (under "the prevailing interpretation of s. 12..., the trial judge
had no discretion to exclude" at 701).
125 See ibid ("the trial judge is under a duty in cases where the accused has been
cross-examined as to prior convictions to instruct the jury as to the limited permissible
use it can make of such evidence" at 688-89). The trial judge in Corbett told the jury that
the accused's criminal record
can only be used to assess the credibility of the Accused and for no other purpose. Because the
Accused was previously convicted of murder, it must not be used by you, theJury, as evidence to
prove that theAccused person committed the murder .... You must not, under any circumstances,
come to the conclusion that, because he has a criminal record, he would be more inclined or
predisposed to commit this particular offence[:]
ibid at 682.
12' The accused claimed aviolation of the right to a fair hearing under paragraph 11(d) of the
Charter, supra note 6.
127 Writing for three members of the court, Dickson CJC concluded that the trial judge had
a discretion to exclude the criminal record of an accused witness but that the trial judge
nonetheless properly admitted the accused's record in the circumstances.Justice McIntyre,
with whom LeDain J concurred, reasoned that the accused's record was properly
admitted because section 12 made its admission mandatory.
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with whom two judges concurred, and LaForestJ in sole dissent, agreed that
such discretion exists. Beyond that area of agreement, the two judges took
entirely divergent approaches to this limited-admissibility problem."'
The ChiefJustice repeatedly affirmed his belief in the jury's ability to
abide by limiting instructions. In the view of Dickson CJC, embracing a
skeptical view of limiting instructions would mean challenging the very
institution of trial by jury. He reasoned as follows:
[I]t would be quite wrong to make too much of the risk that the jury might
use the evidence for an improper purpose. This line of thinking could
seriously undermine the entire jury system .... Jury directions are often long
and difficult, but the experience of trial judges is that juries do perform their
duty according to the law.... [U]ntil the paradigm is altered by Parliament,
the court should not be heard to call into question the capacity ofjuries to
do the job assigned to them. The ramifications of any such statement could
be enormous." 9
Evidently alarmed at the prospect of courts overstepping their institutional
bounds by questioning the basic structure of the trial system, the Chief
Justice advocated confidence in juries'abilities to followjudicial instructions.
Justice LaForest rejected the ChiefJustice's attempts to "assert away" 30
the problems with section 12 by relying on general statements offaith in the
jury. For LaForestJ, the provision was open to abuse by prosecutors seeking
to evade the character-evidence prohibition."' As a species ofbad character
evidence, criminal-record information carried a heavy potential prejudice
that had to be weighed against the often limited value of the information on
28 See Peter Sankoff, "Corbett Revisited: A Fairer Approach to the Admission of an
Accused's Prior Criminal Record in Cross-Examination" (2006) 51:4 Crim LQ400 (the
judgments in "tone and approach are markedly opposed" at 409).
129 Corbett, supra note 5 at 692-93 [emphasis in original].
130 Ibid at 727.
Ibid ("s. 12 significantly, and often invidiously, circumvents the complex of rules that
precludes, in general, the introduction by the Crown of evidence of an accused's 'bad
character'" at 725).
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the issue of credibility.3 2 This strong potential prejudice was well-known,
LaForestJ argued, and the law should forthrightly acknowledge it: 3
[I]t is specious to say that to recognize what we know from experience to be
the limitations of the human reasoning process is simultaneously to discredit
the general utility of the jury as an instrument of justice. Indeed, an
appreciation of human limitations can only redound to the benefit of the
system as a whole by ensuring that these are accounted for and protected
against. We deceive ourselves ifwe expect the jury to reason in ways that we,
as lawyers and judges, know from experience to be often unrealistic,
if not impossible'?
Thus, LaForest J urged courts to recognize openly the risk that limiting
instructions might fail to constrain jury reasoning.
The ChiefJustice and LaForest J agreed on the factors influencing the
discretion to exclude criminal-record evidence: recent convictions and those
for crimes of dishonesty were more probative on the legitimate issue of
credibility, while previous convictions for offences similar to the offence
charged were more indicative ofpropensity and therefore more prejudicial."
However, the two judges differed on how often the discretion to exclude
should be exercised. Justice LaForest called it a "salutary discretion"'3 6 and
seemed to envision that criminal-record evidence would frequently be
excluded because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value."3
Chief Justice Dickson, on the other hand, called on judges to use their
132 Ibid (criminal-record evidence appears more probative ofpropensity than credibility "as a
matter of logic and human experience" at 726).
133 Ibid ("a resoundingly uniform body ofjudicial and academic opinion, as well as empirical
evidence ... [supported the notion that section 12 was] capable of causing manifold
prejudice to the interests of the accused (and, for that matter, of the public) in afair trial"
at 724).
134 Ibid at 727.
1 See ibid at 740-43 (LaForest J), 698 (Dickson CJC). Both judges also agreed that a
defence attack on the credibility of Crown witnesses with criminal records of their own
could militate in favour of admitting the accused's criminal record, lest the jury be left
with an unbalanced view of the various witnesses.
136 Ibidat721.
137 Seeibidat745.
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discretion to exclude only in "unusual circumstances".' These conflicting
approaches-with no majority of the court adopting any one interpretation
of the discretion-have generated marked inconsistencies in the way lower
courts deal with an accused witness's criminal record. Indeed, after
extensively reviewing the cases applying Corbett, Peter Sankoff concluded
that the discretion to exclude "operates in a highly erratic manner, virtually to
the point of complete randomness.""
Corbett's legacy of confusion and ambivalence extends beyond the trial
judge's discretion to exclude the criminal record of an accused witness. This
ambivalence also shapes the law's approach to limited admissibility more
generally. Some judges embrace the doctrine, confidently parsing the
permissible and impermissible uses of evidence in the apparent expectation
that fact-finders-both judges and juries-will apply those distinctions
faithfully. Other judges express skepticism about limited admissibility,
questioning whether those same distinctions are coherent and capable of
being applied, especially in jury trials.
B. THE TENSION IN THE CURRENT LAW
Canadian law on limiting instructions thus continues to reflect the conflict
that divided the Court in Corbett. Within the cases, the dominant discourse
remains optimistic, but a more skeptical strain of discourse persists. This
section provides some recent examples of case law exemplifying these
opposing approaches. Given that limited-admissibility problems arise
constantly, it would be impractical to attempt an exhaustive survey of the
Canadian courts'treatment of the issue. Instead, this section considers four
cases in which the Supreme Court has recently grappled with
limited-admissibility problems, two of which arguably represent an
optimistic approach and two of which seem to illustrate a more
skeptical view.
"s Ibid at 692.
'9 Sankoffsupra note 128 at 403.
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1. THE OPTIMISM OF DINARDOAND GRIFFIN
Canadian courts tend to be sanguine about limited admissibility: convinced
that the proper uses of evidence can be distinguished from improper
purposes, and confident that those distinctions can be given effect in the
fact-finding process. As we have seen, this confidence carries some risks.
Judges may rely on limiting instructions that fail, in practice, to constrain
jury reasoning. And, buoyed by the sense that whatever distinctions they
draw can be put into effect, courts may maintain subtle or illusory
distinctions that cannot reasonably direct the reasoning of any fact-finder,
jury, or judge. Examples of this optimistic attitude and its disadvantages can
be found in the cases of Rv Dinardo * and R v Grifin.'14
Dinardo concerned an allegation ofsexual assault by a youngwoman with
an intellectual disability. The complainant claimed that a taxi driver touched
her breasts and vagina while she was a passenger. She spontaneously reported
these events to several individuals on the day they allegedly occurred, and she
testified at trial consistently with those early reports. In convicting the
accused, the trial judge found that the consistency ofthe complainant's story
provided a "form ofcorroboration" 4 1 ofher testimony. The Supreme Court
allowed the accused's appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial
judge used the complainant's prior consistent statements for an
impermissible purpose. Writing for the Court, Charron J reasoned that the
prior consistent statements were inadmissible for the purpose ofconfirming
the complainant's testimony, and the trial judge erred in using the statements
that way.'43 However, Charron J explained that the statements were
admissible for the purpose of establishing the narrative of the
complainant's disclosure.'4
140 Supra note 38.
"' 2009 SCC 28 at para 71, [2009] 2 SCR 42 [Griffin].
142 Dinardo, supra note 38 at para 17.
1 Ibid at para 40.
'4 Ibid (the statements could "be used for the limited purpose ofhelping the trier of fact to
understand how the complainant's story was initially disclosed" at para 37).
2013 271
UBC LAW REVIEW
The Court in Dinardo clearly repudiated the proposition that a witness's
mere repetition of a story makes the story more likely to be true. The law's
longstanding rejection of that proposition underlies the general prohibition
on prior consistent statements. ' Yet, one might question whether CharronJ
succeeded in drawing a workable distinction between the permissible and
impermissible uses of the evidence. She explained the proper purpose for
which the trial judge should have considered the prior consistent
statements as follows:
[I]n light of the evidence that the complainant had difficultysituating events
in time, was easily confused, and lied on occasion, the spontaneous nature of
the initial complaint and the complainant's repetition of the essential
elements of the allegations provide important context for
assessing her credibility.4'
Presumably, given the complainant's intellectual disability and her
consequent challenges as a witness, the prior consistent statements offered
valuable "context" for judging her credibility, because their spontaneity and
consistent repetition offered some assurance that she was telling the truth.
How then was the trial judge wrong to conclude that the complainant's
consistency was a factor tending to suggest her story was true? At bottom,
there is little difference between the permissible and impermissible uses of
prior consistent statements laid out in Dinardo.147
Dinardo was not a jury case, but it is worth considering whether a jury
would be capable of applying this limited-admissibility rule. Even if the
distinction between considering the complainant's prior statements as
confirmation of her story and using them to gauge her credibility can be
sustained at a conceptual level, one might doubt whether this distinction
could be explained to the jury in a comprehensible manner. Ultimately, the
145 See e.g. Stirling, supra note 37 ("it is impermissible to assume that because a witness has
made the same statement in the past, he or she is more likely to be telling the
truth" at para 7).
146 Dinardo, supra note 38 at para 39.
117 See Lisa Dufraimont, "R v. Dinardo: Troubling Issues Regarding Prior Consistent
Statements" (2008) 57 CR (6th) 76 at 77.
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Supreme Court's holding in Dinardo exemplifies what Blinka has called
"limited admissibility's flawed preoccupation with analytic precision and
sophistic distinctions."148
A similarly troubled distinction underlies the discussion of limited
admissibility in Griffin."' In that case, a murder victim told his girlfriend
that if anything should happen to him, the accused would be responsible.
Shortly thereafter the victim was shot to death. By a majority, the Supreme
Court held that the trial judge properly admitted the victim's statement
subject to a limiting instruction to the jury that the statement could be used
as evidence of the victim's state of mind but not of the accused's state of
mind.n'o For the majority, CharronJ observed that this instruction accurately
reflected the state of mind or present intentions exception to the hearsay
rule, which permits hearsay statements to be admitted only on the issue of
the declarant's own mental state.'"' CitingDickson CJC's opinion in Corbett,
Charron J expressed confidence in the jury's ability to abide by the
instruction."'
On the surface, this limiting instruction appears relatively
straightforward. The problem with the instruction is that the victim's state of
mind was immaterial except to the extent that it could ground an inference
about the accused's intentions. The fact that the victim thought the accused
might harm him was only relevant because it would tend to show that the
accused did, indeed, intend to harm him. But using the statement to infer the
accused's state of mind was supposed to be impermissible. In the words of the
dissenting judges, who concluded that the statement should have been
excluded entirely, "the victim's state of mind is irrelevant on its own, and it is
impermissible to use it to infer [the accused's] motive"."I Thus, as in
148 Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls" supra note 18 at 1247.
14 Griffin,supra note 141.
"0 Ibid at para71.
"' Ibid at para 57, citing Starr, supra note 29 at para 172.
152 Griffin, supra note 141 ("juries must be trusted to have the requisite intelligence to
perform their duties in accordance with the instructions given to them by the trial judge"
at para 72).
153 Ibid at para 105, LeBel and Fish JJ, dissenting.
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Dinardo, the distinction between the permissible and impermissible uses of
evidence in Grifin seems to collapse upon examination.
Justice Charron defended the distinction in Griffin by arguing that the
victim's fearful state of mind was indicative of the nature of the victim's
relationship with the accused, which in turn could be evidence of the
accused's motive to harm the victim.5 4 But adding a step to the Court's
description of the inferential process does not change the nature of that
process. Ultimately, the jury would be invited to reason from the victim's fear
of the accused to the accused's malicious intent. Jurors would likely be
confused by an instruction simultaneously warning them to avoid this
impermissible inference and inviting them to draw it through the vague
mediating concept of the parties' "relationship" Even if some arguable
legitimate purpose for the evidence could be maintained, that purpose would
likely have trivial practical significance for the jury in the face of the natural
temptation to conclude that the victim was right when he said the accused
might harm him."' Griffin and Dinardo demonstrate the difficulties with
judicial optimism toward limited admissibility. An excess of confidence in
the doctrine can generate untenable distinctions between the permissible and
impermissible uses of evidence and drive reliance on limiting instructions
that appear doomed to failure.
2. THE SKEPTICISM OF HANDYAND HENRY
While optimism remains the courts'prevailing attitude, an important strain
of skepticism toward limited admissibility persists in Canadian law. Some
judges have questioned or discarded certain applications ofthe doctrine. The
Supreme Court's judgments in Rv Handy" and R vHenry' 7 exemplify this
skeptical approach.
5 Ibid at paras 63-64.
15 See ibid ("[i]t is difficult to justify admitting the statement for a marginally probative and
tangential purpose while insisting that the jury not use it in the most obvious and
prejudicial way possible" at para 108).
'1 2002 SCC 56, [20021 SCR 908 [Handy].
157 2005 SCC 76, [20051 3 SCR 609 [Henry].
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In Handy, the Court enunciated the modern Canadian law on
similar-fact evidence. Traditionally at common law, evidence ofthe accused's
prior discreditable conduct was inadmissible for the purpose ofshowing the
accused's propensity to commit the offence charged. Evidence ofsuch similar
facts could be only admitted for other purposes,"' such as to prove the
identity of the perpetrator or rebut the accused's claim that death was
accidental.'" This traditional "category approach"'6 0 to similar facts plainly
constituted a rule oflimited admissibility: use of the evidence for propensity
was prohibited, and admissibility depended on the proponent's ability to
identify some alternative, legitimate purpose. Over time, the Canadian courts
moved away from the category approach,'6 ' with the Supreme Court finally
repudiating categories entirely in its unanimous judgment in Handy. Handy
established that similar-fact evidence is generally inadmissible because of its
highly prejudicial effect against the accused, but that a narrow exception
exists making similar facts admissible where the probative value outweighs
their prejudicial effect.6 2
' See Ronald Joseph Delisle, Don Stuart & David M Tanovich, Evidence: Principles and
Problems, 9th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) ("[c]ourts for many years in England and
Canadawould only admit similar fact evidence if it was relevant to some issue other than
propensity" at 244).
'5 See ibid, citing the classic statement of the traditional approach tosimilar-fact evidence in
Makin vAttorney-GeneralforNew South Wales,[ 1894] AC 57 at 65,58JP 148 (PC). See
also R v B (CR), [1990] 1 SCR 717, [1990] 3 WWR 385 [B (CR) cited to SCR]
(historically, situations where similar-fact evidence was admissible "were reified into a
series of categories.... Similar fact evidence was admitted to show intent, a system, a plan,
malice, identity, as well as to rebut the defences of accident, mistake and innocent
association" at 724).
16 B (CR), ibid at 723.
1 See especially R v Sweitzer, [1982] 1 SCR 949, 137 DLR (3d) 702; B (CR), supra note
159, McLachlinJ ("[i] t is no longer necessary to hang the evidence tendered on the pegof
some issue other than disposition" at 731). But see ibid, Sopinka J, dissenting ("I am
unable therefore to subscribe to the theory that in exceptional cases propensity alone can
be the basis for admissibility" at 744).
162 Handy, supra note 156 at paras 31-55.
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Handy essentially eliminated the limited-admissibility aspect of the
similar-fact evidence rule. The Court declared that similar facts could be
admitted as propensity evidence where their probative value on that issue
outweighed the great potential prejudice.'63 Writing for the Court, BinnieJ
disclaimed the courts' often fruitless attempts to distinguish prohibited
propensity reasoning from the alternative, ostensibly legitimate purposes for
similar-fact evidence." If the evidence was in fact being admitted to
establish propensity, he reasoned, courts should acknowledge that use
instead of obscuring it with untenable distinctions."I Propensity evidence
should be frankly accepted as such, BinnieJ wrote, because " [b]y affirming its
true character, . . . the Court keeps front and centre its dangerous
potential"' *" Thus, by excising limited-admissibility concerns from the
analysis, the Court at once simplified the test for admissibility ofsimilar-fact
evidence and reaffirmed a focus on the central problem of prejudice.
Admittedly, where similar-fact evidence is admitted, Canadian law still
requires juries to be instructed to avoid reasoning that the accused's character
or disposition makes him or her the sort of person likely to have committed
the charged offence. 6 7 This instruction seems strange since the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that similar facts can now be admitted to show
propensity."I Arguably, the practice of instructing juries in this way should
be abandoned."' In any event, under current law it seems difficult to
characterize this instruction as a "limiting instruction" because no categorical
163 Ibid at paras 59-60.
' See ibid ("Propensity Evidence by Any Other Name Is Still Propensity
Evidence" at para 59).
1 See ibid ("propensity evidence... must be recognized for what it is" at para 61).
'6 Ibid.
'67 See R v Shearing, 2002 SCC 58 at para 67, [2002] 3 SCR 33 (Shearing]; R vArp, [1998]
3 SCR 339 at para 80, 166 DLR (4th) 296; Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 1
at 747.
168 See Delisle, Stuart & Tanovich, supra note 158 at 279.
169 But see Michael Plaxton & Glen Luther, "Limiting Instructions and Similar Facts" (2009)
63 CR (6th) 12 (suggesting that courts adopt "a new instruction ... explaining that
similar fact evidence can be used to infer specific but not general propensity" at 23).
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distinction remains between the permissible and impermissible uses of the
evidence. Perhaps the remaining instruction may be best understood as a
caution to the jury, in light of the acknowledged prejudicial potential of
similar-fact evidence, to avoid general propensity reasoning "from bad
personhood to guilt".'70
The Supreme Court's wisdom in eliminating the limited-admissibility
aspect of the law on similar facts becomes apparent when one considers the
situation in the United States, where prior bad acts are still generally only
admitted if they fit into some non-propensity category."' Prosecutors
frequently abuse this rule, conjuring some colourable legitimate purpose as a
way to bring the accused's prior discreditable conduct before the jury.7 2 The
Canadian approach appears, by contrast, refreshingly direct. Instead of
occupying themselves with frail distinctions between propensity reasoning
and other uses of similar-fact evidence, Canadian courts must now decide
admissibility by weighing the probative value and prejudicial effects
of the evidence.
Another example of the Supreme Court's occasional skepticism toward
limited admissibility emerges from its unanimous judgment in Henry.7 3 This
case concerned the accused's constitutional protection against
self-incrimination under section 13 of the Charter, which provides as
follows: "A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have
any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any
o70 Shearing, supra note 167 at para 57.
17 Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.... This
evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident[l:]
Fed REvid 404(b). Special rules favouringwider admission of such information govern in
cases of sexual assault and child molestation (see Fed R Evid 413-15).
172 As explained in Blinka, "Ethical Firewalls" supra note 18 at 1241:
In criminal cases, prosecutors frequently proffer ('sneak'?) evidence of the defendant's prior bad
acts and criminal conduct not to prove his bad character (and hence guilt), but ostensibly to prove
other propositions, such as motive, opportunity, plan, intent, and the like. Often the realdifficulty
is that the distinction between the permissible purpose and the forbidden character inference is
strained or nonexistent.
17 Supra note 157.
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other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of
contradictory evidence " 4 In contrast toAmerican law, 7 Canadian law does
not excuse witnesses from testifying when their testimony might incriminate
them."'7 Instead, witnesses can be made to testify, but section 13 provides use
immunity for their compelled testimony. Thus, the purpose of section 13 is
to prevent "individuals from being indirectly compelled to
incriminate themselves."
For many years, the section 13 jurisprudence employed the concept of
limited admissibility. In R v Kuldip,7 7 a majority of the Supreme Court
interpreted use immunity under section 13 as covering only those situations
where the prior testimony was used "to incriminate" the accused, as opposed
to the distinct purpose of impeaching the accused's credibility.'79 Therefore,
prior compelled testimony could be used against the accused for the limited
purpose of impeaching credibility, as long as the trial judge delivered a
limiting instruction to the jury explaining that the evidence could not be
used to incriminate. so
174 Charter, supra note 6.
" The FifthAmendment of the US Constitution protects the accused's privilege to refuse to
testify when his or her answers would be incriminating: US Const amend V.
176 See Canada EvidenceAct, supra note 123, s 5(1), which provides as follows: "No witness
shall be excused from answering any question on the ground that the answer to the
question may tend to criminate him".
' Dubois v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 350 at 358, 23 DLR (4th) 503.
1'7 [1990] 3 SCR 618,61 CCC (3d) 385 [Kuldip cited to SCRI.
'79 Ibid ("[u]sing a prior inconsistent statement from a former proceeding during
cross-examination in order to impugn the credibility of an accused does not, in my view,
incriminate that accused person" at 634).
"s Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in Kuldip, ibid at 634-35, Lamer CJC
offered an infamous hypothetical example. If B testified at someone else's trial that he (B)
was in Montreal committing a bank robbery on a particular day, and ifB was subsequently
accused of that bank robbery and testified in his own defence that he (B) was in Ottawa
on that day, section 13 would not prevent the Crown from putting the prior inconsistent
statement to B in cross-examination for the purposes of impeaching his credibility. To
ensure that the evidence would not be used for an improper incriminatory purpose, the
ChiefJustice suggested that the trial judge should offer a limiting instruction inviting the
jury to use the prior inconsistent statement to assess whether the accused was lying about
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As the Court began to recognize some years later, this application of the
doctrine of limited admissibility raised both conceptual and practical
problems. Conceptually, the distinction between incriminating and
credibility impeaching uses of prior testimonywas unstable because every use
of evidence against an accused is, broadly speaking, incriminating. "8
Practically, any limiting instruction based on this troubled distinction
appeared likely to be ineffective, especially in light of the jury's natural
inclination to be influenced by incriminating evidence. 8 The significance of
these practical and conceptual problems was heightened in the Charter
context, since the accused's constitutional protection against compelled
self-incrimination would rise and fall on the solidity of the distinction and
the effectiveness of the limiting instruction. Consequently, in R v Noel,"I a
majority of the Supreme Court narrowed the limited admissibility rule
under section 13 by holding that an accused's prior testimony should be
inadmissible even for impeachment purposes unless there existed "no realistic
danger of incrimination." 84
The full Supreme Court finally repudiated the concept of limited
admissibility under section 13 in Henry. Emphasizing that the analysis
should focus on the purpose of the Charter right-to protect the accused
being in Ottawa, but forbidding the jury from relying on the statement as proof that the
accused was in Montreal and committed the robbery. As BinnieJ observed on behalf of
the Court in Henry, supra note 157 at para 32, "few triers of fact, whether judge or jurors
... would not have found the prior admission of the accused, that on the day in question
he was in Montreal robbing a bank, probative on the issue of guilt of that offence."
181 See R v Noil, 2002 SCC 67, [2002] 3 SCR 433 [Nod] ("[t]hat subtle distinction...
disappears... when the two uses-the permitted one and the prohibited one-are totally
intermingled" at para 27). See also e.g. Hamish Stewart, "Henry in the Supreme Court of
Canada: Reorienting the s.13 Right against Self-Incrimination" (2006) 34CR(6th) 112
("[t]here is no possibility of drawing a stable and fair distinction between these two uses
of the accused's prior testimony, given that the purpose of undermining the accused's
credibility is to persuade the jury that he is guilty" at 115).
182 See Noil, supra note 181 (the impermissible use of the evidence would likely hold
"irresistible appeal to the jury" at para 27).
183 Ibid.
18 Ibid at para 30.
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against indirect self-incrimination that is compelled-Binnie J held that,
contrary to prior case law,"' nothing turned on the tortured distinction
between impeachment and incrimination.' Rather, section 13 should be
interpreted as granting the accused immunity from having prior compelled
testimony used against him or her for any purpose."I In Henry, as in Handy,
the Supreme Court repudiated an unworkable application ofthe doctrine of
limited admissibility.
There are, ofcourse, numerous important distinctions between Dinardo,
Griffn, Henry, and Handy. These four Supreme Court cases represent areas
of evidence law as diverse as hearsay, character, and self-incrimination. The
forgoing comparison is not intended to mask these distinctions or even to
deny that these diverse doctrinal contexts may have played a part in the way
the court approached the limited-admissibility problem in each case. Rather,
the purpose here is to draw out the very different ways of reasoning about
limited admissibility that continue to exist in Canadian law.
8 Henry,supra note 157 expressly overruled this part of Kuldip,supra note 178.
* SeeHenry,supra note 157 ("prior compelled evidence should, under s. 13 ... , be treated as
inadmissible in evidence against the accused, even for the ostensible purpose of
challenging his or her credibility" at para 50).
'8 Recently in R v Nedelcu, 2012 SCC 59, 353 DLR (4th) 199 (Nedelcu], the Supreme
Court reintroduced some complexity into the section 13 analysis by concluding that use
immunity only covers prior compelled testimony evidence that is "incriminating" in the
sense that "the Crown could use at the subsequent proceeding, if it were permitted to do
so, to prove guilt" (ibid at para 9). As the dissenting judges pointed out, this distinction
between evidence that is incriminating or non-incriminating in nature appears unstable
and may lead to confusion in future cases (see ibid at paras 110-32). However, the
majority specifically rejected the idea that it was resurrecting the distinction between
incriminating and non-incriminating uses of the evidence. Consistent with Henry, the
majority affirmed that, where it applies, section 13 precludes the Crown from using the
evidence against the accused for any purpose (ibid at paras 18,37). Consequently, however
problematic the distinction introduced in Nedelcu, the Court has not gone so far as to
recreate a limited-admissibility problem under section 13.
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IV. RATIONALIZING LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY
As we have seen, Canadian courts have adopted various, sometimes
conflicting approaches to limited admissibility in different areas ofevidence
law. Because limited-admissibility rules are so common, however, and
because the doctrine raises similar conceptual and practical difficulties
whenever it is used, a more consistent approach to limited admissibility
would represent a vital advance in the law. This part aims to outline what
such an approach might look like.
A. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The courts' differing approaches to limited admissibility reflect diverse
perspectives on the jury, on the role (if any) of psycho-legal research in the
evolution of the law, and on the purposes of evidentiary regulation. This
section briefly explores these underlying issues and suggests three guiding
principles that together could form the foundation of a more coherent
approach to limited admissibility in Canadian law.
1. ACCEPTING JURY LEGITIMACY
The jury represents a vital institution within the Canadian legal system.
While bench trials far outnumber jury trials even in the criminal-law
context,'8 8 the jury trial retains great systemic importance in the criminal law
because of its status as a constitutional right of the accused and because the
most serious criminal cases are commonly tried by jury."' It therefore seems
uncontroversial that the law should reflect respect for the jury, and courts
should not be heard to question the legitimacy of jury adjudication. At the
same time, Courts would be wise to recognize that most if not all
common-law judges hold juries in high esteem, and it is generally unhelpful
188 See e.g. Neil Vidmar, "The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching For a Middle Ground"
(1999) 62:2 Law & Contemp Probs 141 (in Canada, "the vast bulk of criminal cases, at
least ninety percent, are tried by judge alone" at 147).
189 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; Gerry Ferguson, "Community Participation in
Criminal Jury Trials and Restorative Justice Programs" (2001) [unpublished, archived
with author] ("of the more serious cases that do go to trial, jury trials are a common mode
of trial" at 42).
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to accuse other judges of undermining jury legitimacy. Regrettably, this
rhetorical technique remains all too common in the Canadian cases,
especially in the area of limited admissibility. Ever since Dickson CJC
adopted this style of argument in Corbett,'9 0 judges who question the
effectiveness of judicial instructions have been regularly charged with
denigrating the institution of the jury.' One wonders whether the
prevalence of this line of argument has had a chilling effect on legitimate
debate about the doctrine of limited admissibility.
But to what extent are common-law judges bound to uphold the premise
that juries follow judicial instructions? Certainly respect for the jury system
entails a weak version of this premise. Our practice of explaining the law to
juries would be a sham without a basic level of confidence that those
explanations have real effects. Thus, jury legitimacy requires some
commitment to the idea that juries normally try to follow judicial
instructions and that they are generally capable of doing so."9 However, as
we have seen, courts often adopt a strong version of this premise, defending
the notion that juries unfailingly abide by whatever instructions they are
given.193 The strong version of this premise flies in the face of the available
empirical evidence on limiting instructions. Worse, it may impede the
development of the law.
'9 See Corbett, supra note 5. See also the discussion at III.A, above.
191 See e.g. Griffin, supra note 141 ("[t]o make too much of the risk that the jury might
misuse evidence is contrary to established principles of law regarding jury trials" at para
72). See also supra note 120 and accompanying text; Lisa Dufraimont, "R v Mijevic:
Reflections on Faith in the Jury" (2011) 82 CR (6th) 8.
192 In his dissenting reasons in Corbett, supra note 5 at 727, LaForest J accepted "the
time-honoured and obviously practical and necessary assumption that jurors are
eminently capable of following a judge's limiting instructions respecting the uses to which
evidence may be put" See also Ritter, supra note 41 ("[n]ot believing that jurors do their
best and are usually successful in following a court's directives could have arguably
unacceptable consequences" at 204); Sankoff,supra note 128 (quite properly, "judges...
intrinsically accept . . . that juries are capable of following instructions in the
majority of cases" at 433).
193 See the discussion in Part II.B, above. See also Ritter, supra note 41 ("there is far less
practical necessity to cling to a presumption that all jury instructions are
understood" at 204).
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When courts stubbornly adhere to the idea that juries always follow
instructions (including limiting instructions), there can be no opportunity to
ponder the effectiveness ofany particular instruction, and no opportunity for
instructions to be improved. But like any other part of the procedural law,
limiting instructions should be evaluated and refined over time. To put the
matter another way, courts have sometimes succumbed to the fallacy that
when juries have problems complying with limiting instructions, that must
mean something is wrong with the jury. They have overlooked a more
plausible explanation: that something is wrong with the instructions.
Arguably, then, courts addressing limited-admissibility problems should be
guided by a moderate principle of respect for the jury, avoidingboth extreme
skepticism and blind faith. Juries would be viewed as capable of discharging
their duties, but there would always be room to question and improve the
procedural rules surrounding jury adjudication.'"
2. ASPIRING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM
A second principle that could guide courts in their approach to limited
admissibility is psychological realism. Under this principle, courts would
strive to apply evidence rules that are realistic from a psychological point of
view. To the extent that empirical research yields insights into the operation
of limited-admissibility rules, courts would consider those insights in
shaping the law. Admittedly, the empirical work on jury psychology provides
no easy solutions for limited-admissibility problems; the research can be
difficult to interpret, is constantly developing, and does not resolve the basic
question of what to do when evidence supports both legitimate and
improper inferences. But these challenges do not appear to justify ignoring
the lessons of psychology. Rather, the law would be best served by courts
a One prominent Canadian jurist put it this way:
The institution of trial by jury in criminal cases is not fatally flawed. True, it has its problems. But
the problems do not begin and end with juror competence. Judicial adherence to rigid trial
procedures and practices that ignore incontrovertible learning about juror comprehension and
decision-making are at the same time a significant part of the problem and a substantial
impediment to its solution[:]
David Watt, Helpinglurors Understand (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 2.
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constantly working to improve evidentiary rules and jury-instruction
practices using the best information available.
Encouragingly, existing psycho-legal research suggests that courts can
make changes to enhance the effectiveness of limiting instructions. The
research points to various factors-including adjustments to the language,
timing, and content of instructions-that might increase jury compliance
with judicial admonitions."' In the parlance of experimental psychology,
these factors are "system variables" because they lie within the control of the
justice system."' To this point, the empirical work on limiting and disregard
instructions has primarily demonstrated the effects of such system
variables.' Consequently, judges and policymakers have reason to be
confident that changes in courtroom procedures can result in real
improvements to the effectiveness of limiting instructions.
3. FOCUSING ON THE UNDERLYING POLICY
The third suggested guiding principle is that courts addressing
limited-admissibility issues should centre their analysis on the policies
behind the rules. The distinctions between the permissible and
impermissible uses of evidence can be conceptually challenging, and judges
who become preoccupied with these distinctions may neglect the underlying
values and interests at stake. In Henry, for example, Binnie J explained that
the section 13 analysis went off track when the courts began to focus on the
distinction between incrimination and impeachment, losing sight of the
basic purpose of section 13: protection against compelled
' See Part II.B.3, above.
196 See Gary L Wells, "Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research: System Variables and
Estimator Variables" (1978) 36:12 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1546
("system variables" are to be contrasted with "estimator variables" that are "not under the
control of the criminal justice system. . . . [Tihey cannot be controlled in actual
criminal cases" at 1548).
'9 See Steblay et al, supra note 57 ("fortunately, the greatest variability in the current data
involves system variables, suggesting room for productive intervention" at 489).
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self-incrimination.19 While the Charter context of Henry made such a
purposive interpretation all the more appropriate,'9 focusing on the policies
driving the rules seems suitable in the context of limited admissibility more
generally. Such a focus accords with the Canadian courts' emphasis on
principled analysis of evidence law,200 and it provides some assurance that
courts will design and implement rules that are reasonably well-calibrated to
achieve their objectives.
The task of identifying these underlying policies is complicated by the
fact that, by nature, limited admissibility pursues competing policies.
Limited-use evidence carries some value for its legitimate purpose, but using
the evidence for its impermissible purpose can result in prejudice to the
opposing party. The very reason to admit evidence for a limited purpose is to
reconcile these competing demands. Thus, to grasp the policy implications of
a limited-admissibility rule requires assessing both the value of the evidence
in terms of the permitted inference and the nature of the potential prejudice
flowing from the impermissible inference. In this context, the courts must
decide whether the doctrine of limited admissibility strikes an
appropriate balance.
This policy-focus principle-like the principles of jury legitimacy and
psychological realism-may seem largely uncontroversial. Certainly these
suggested guiding principles represent no radical departure from our
traditions of evidence law. Rather, the principles are intended to serve as
common ground on which a more rational approach to limited admissibility
could be developed.
'9 Henry, supra note 157 (twenty years of experience "shows that taking our eye off the
underlying purpose of s. 13 has given rise to a number of distinctions and sub-distinctions
that in the end have proven unworkable" at para 42).
'9 See Hunter et al v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145, 11 DLR (4th) 641 ("the proper
approach to the interpretation ofthe Charter ofRights and Freedoms is a purposive one"
at 157, cited to SCR).
200 For example, on the "principled approach" to hearsay, see Khelawon, supra note 14.
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B. A REFINED ANALYSIS OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY
This section presents a concrete proposal for a two-step analysis that could
be applied to any limited-admissibility issue. The first step would be a
necessity test: the doctrine oflimited admissibility would only be employed
when necessary. Second, where the necessity test is met, courts would deploy
the doctrine in a way that incorporates the learning from the psychological
research on jury instructions. In particular, judges would apply
limited-admissibility rules with a view to persuading the jury.
1. ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY RULES
The discussion of limited admissibility in this paper has revealed that the
doctrine is plagued with difficulty. The psychological literature suggests that
limiting instructions are likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive,20'
and limited admissibility generates seemingly intractable problems on a
conceptual level as well.22 To be realistic about the doctrine, one must admit
that limited admissibility never represents an ideal solution to any evidence
problem. At best, the doctrine may constitute the most acceptable
accommodation of competing demands.20 Consequently, the proposed
analysis of limited admissibility begins with the question of necessity. Even
where both permissible and impermissible uses ofevidence can be identified,
frequently the interests of justice will be best served by admitting the
evidence entirely or excluding it outright. Limited-admissibility rules should
only be retained where they are necessary to protect some important
policy or value.2*
Two situations can be imagined where limited admissibility would fail
this necessity test. First, as we have seen, the distinctions between the
permissible and impermissible uses of evidence are often subtle or even
201 See Part II.B.2, above, "Empirical doubts about limiting instructions".
2 See Part II.C, above, "Conceptual confusion"
203 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
204 For an argument that courts should never use a limiting or disregard instruction "unless
requested by an affected parry who wants to incorporate it into its argument", see
Tanford, supra note 53 at 107.
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illusory. No purpose is served by instructing a fact-finder to draw impossible
distinctions, and limited-admissibility rules based on such distinctions
should be identified and discarded. 205 Even when the permissible and
impermissible uses of evidence are meaningfully different, the question
remains whether the policies underlying the rule warrant the application of
limited admissibility. Unless the impermissible use threatens some significant
interest or value, it may be better to admit the evidence without limitation.
Equally, if the permissible use is tenuous or overshadowed by the prohibited
inference, then exclusion might be the best result. In short, only when the
permissible and impermissible uses of the evidence generate a real policy
conflict should the doctrine of limited admissibility be engaged.
A few examples may demonstrate how this necessity test could work. In
Grffln,206 the distinction between the permissible and impermissible use of
the hearsay statement was so weak as to be of no real value. The jury was
instructed that it could use the murder victim's statement that he feared the
accused as evidence of the victim's state of mind only, and not as evidence of
the accused's state ofmind. But the victim's fear was only probative because it
pointed to the accused's malice. In this circumstance, resort to the doctrine of
limited admissibility was unnecessary because there was no manageable
distinction to maintain. In light of the danger that the jury might be
impressed by this unreliable hearsay statement, the basis of which was
unknown, outright exclusion would have been the appropriate
result in that case.o207
Even where the distinction between the permissible and impermissible
uses of evidence appears more solid, in many cases the underlying policies
would not justify applying the doctrine of limited admissibility. Exclusion
would seem appropriate, for example, where the proponent of the evidence
advances a permissible purpose simply as a way to evade an exclusionary rule
205 See Blinka, "Delusion", supra note 3 ("modify or discard those rules which turn on
distinctions that are so subtle that instructions cannot be formulated and even lawyers
cannot be expected to appreciate the distinctions within the context of the trial" at 823).
20' See Griffn, supra note 141, and the discussion of that case in Part II.B.1, above.
207 This was the argument advanced by LeBel and Fish JJ, dissenting.
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and bring prejudicial evidence before the jury.20 In other cases, the legitimate
purpose may pale in comparison to an obvious, impermissible inference, in
which case the risk ofprejudice would be too great to rely on the doctrine of
limited admissibility20 For instance, various commentators have argued that
an accused witness's criminal record should generally be inadmissible, not
because of any theoretical weakness in the distinction between using the
record for credibility and using it for propensity, but because the distinction
seems totally impractical when any fact-finder would be tempted to use the
record for its most obvious but forbidden purpose.2 o Others have argued
that prior-conviction evidence should be freely admitted because, in its
absence, jurors are likely to surmise that the accused has a criminal record
and will be left to speculate about its severity.211 In light of the unanswered
empirical questions about jury reasoning underlying this debate and the
heterogeneity ofprior conviction evidence, one can hardly be confident that
208 See Friedman, "Intro", supra note 15 (where the permissible use is raised as a pretext by a
litigant who wants to see the evidence admitted for its impermissible purpose, "simple
exclusion will be the best result" at xlii).
0 In the famous case of Shepardv United States, 290 US 96 (1933), for example, the accused
was charged with killing his wife. Before her death, the wife had accused the husband of
poisoning her. It was suggested that the wife's statement was admissible not to show that
the husband was the murderer but to rebut the suggesting that the wife intended to
commit suicide. The Supreme Court rejected this application of the doctrine of limited
admissibility because the impermissible purpose was so much more prominent than the
permissible one. The Court held that "[t]he reverberating clangofthose accusatorywords
would drown all weaker sounds": (ibid at 104).
210 Canadian commentators who have advanced this view include Rees, supra note 8 at
347-48 (prior convictions ofan accused witness should generally be inadmissible, even to
go to credibility, but some exceptions should be recognized, as where the accused attacks
the credibility of Crown witnesses on the basis of their own criminal records); Sankoff,
supra note 128. For an American commentary to the same effect, see Robert D Dodson,
"What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really
Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence" (1999) 48:1 Drake L Rev 1 ("current rules allowing
prior convictions to be admitted should be dropped in favour of a categorical rule barring
the admission of prior convictions for impeachment" at 4).
2" See e.g. Larry Laudan & Ronald J Allen, "The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes
Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process" (2011) 101:2 J Crim L &
Criminology 493.
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the ends of justice will be served by always excluding or always admitting
such evidence. However, at least in cases where the accused has a record of
committing similar crimes, the existing empirical evidence supports the view
that the prejudicial effect of admitting the criminal-record evidence will be
great and will likely overwhelm its limited value on the issue ofthe accused's
credibility as a witness. 1 2 In such circumstances, excluding the evidence
outright should be the preferred course. 213
In other circumstances, the prejudice flowing from the impermissible use
of evidence appears so trifling that the evidence would be best admitted
without limitation. Dinardo provides an apt example: 214 In this case, the
complainant's prior consistent statements were inadmissible to confirm the
truth of her allegations at trial, but in light of her intellectual disability the
narrative of her disclosure (and the consistency of her allegations) was
admissible to provide context for assessing her credibility. Even assuming that
this tortured distinction could be maintained, one might question whether
there was any real risk of prejudice flowing from the alleged impermissible
use of the prior consistent statements. Although courts sometimes express
212 See supra notes72 and 76 and accompanying text. Even Laudan &Allan,supra note 211,
who generally doubt the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of the accused's prior
convictions, recognize the weight of the evidence from mock-juror studies of the
prejudicial effect flowing from prior convictions on similar charges (at 514). But see TM
Honess & GA Mathews, "Admitting Evidence of a Defendant's Previous Conviction
(PCE) and Its Impact on Juror Deliberation in Relation to BothJuror-Processing Style
and Juror Concerns over the Fairness of Introducing PCE" (2012) 17:2 Legal and
Criminological Psychology 360, reporting a mock-juror study in which evidence of the
accused's prior conviction on the same offence was not found to be associated in a simple
way with confidence in the accused's guilt. The authors posited that the weaker impact of
the evidence might be attributable to the richness of the trial simulation, which was more
realistic that the simplified trial summaries used in other research (ibid at 377).
213 Excluding evidence ofsimilar prior convictions is permitted and sometimes occurs under
the trial judge's discretion to exclude as recognized in Corbett, supra note 5. However, as
Sankoff has noted, despite empirical evidence of the prejudicial effect of similar prior
convictions, in the Canadian cases "similar convictions are often admitted in
circumstances where no attack was made on the character ofa Crown witness, and even in
instances where other convictions would have remained available to go before the trier of
fact": supra note 128 at 453.
214 See Dinardo, supra note 38 and the discussion of that case in Part II.B.1, above.
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concern about witnesses manufacturing evidence to support their own
testimony,"' it seems unlikely that a jury would be greatly impressed by the
mere repetition of a witness's story. The most persuasive reason to exclude
prior consistent statements is that they waste the court's time."" But such
efficiency concerns may not be weighty enough to warrant applying the
doctrine oflimited admissibility. 17 Arguably, examining the policies at stake
suggests that the complainant's prior consistent statements in Dinardo
should have been freely admitted.
Finally, it seems important to consider an example of a situation where
the necessity test would be met and use of limiting instructions justified. In
Corbett,"' Dickson CJC agreed with LaForestJ that judges hold a discretion
to exclude the criminal record of an accused who testifies, but found that
such exclusion would have been inappropriate in the case at bar. Corbett's
defence was largely based on attacking the credibility ofthe Crown witnesses
on the basis of their own criminal records, and in light of this defence tactic
the ChiefJustice reasoned that excluding Corbett's own record would have
created an unfair imbalance in favour of the accused. 9 In such a case, a real
215 See Bryant, Lederman & Fucrst, supra note 1 (one of the two common rationales for
excluding prior consistent statements is that "no person should be allowed to create
evidence for him or herself" at 395).
216 See Delisle, Stuart & Tanovich, supra note 158 (the best justification for excludingprior
consistent statements relates to "superfluity and consumption of time" at 606); Bryant,
Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 1 at 395 (the second common rationale for excluding
prior consistent statements is that they lack value); Stirling, supra note 37 ("prior
consistent statements are generally inadmissible .... This is because such statements are
usually viewed as lacking probative value and being self-serving" at para 5).
117 See Leonard, Wigmore, supra note 1, ch I ("[]imited admissibility problems certainly
arise in which the relevant danger against which probative value must be weighed is
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. . . . [and
though] these dangers can be significant, they generally do not raise as severe a risk of
inaccurate verdicts as are posed by the other enumerated dangers, which can, for present
purposes, be grouped together under the category of unfair prejudice" at 55).
218 Supra note 5.
9 Ibid ("[hiad Corbett's record been excluded, the jury ... would have been left with the
entirely mistaken impression that while the Crown witnesses were hardened criminals,
Corbett had an unblemished record" at 698).
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policy conflict arises because the grounds for excluding the evidence for its
impermissible purpose (to avoid the heavy prejudice that would come with
revealing the accused's prior conviction on the same charge) and the rationale
for admitting it for its permissible purpose (to avoid the unfairness to the
Crown that would come from concealing the criminal record of the defence's
key witness while highlighting the criminal records of the Crown witnesses)
both appear compelling. In these circumstances, arguably the only
acceptable, albeit imperfect, solution was to admit the record together with
a limiting instruction.
2. OPTIMIZING LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS
Despite its risks, the doctrine of limited admissibility sometimes offers the
only workable solution to evidence problems. Where resort to the doctrine is
necessary, judges should be mindful that while limiting instructions
frequently fail to constrain jury reasoning, there are methods of enhancing
their effectiveness at least to some degree. It behooves judges framing
limiting instructions, in consultation with counsel, to draw insights from the
psychological literature to make those instructions as effective as possible.
Indeed, even judges presiding alone should be mindful of those insights,
since the distinctions they draw might become the basis of limiting
instructions in future cases. The psychological research suggests several ways
to make limiting instructions more effective. For instance, innovations in
language and timing of instructions carry the potential to make limiting
instructions more effective,2  and they warrant further exploration
in Canadian law.22
One particularly promising innovation merits examination here.
Admonitions may be more effective when they incorporate a rationale that
220 See supra notes 96 and 98 and accompanying text.
221 For discussion of these and other jury instruction innovations and their application in
Canadian law, see Marie Comiskey, "Initiating Dialogue AboutJury Comprehension of
Legal Concepts: Can the'Stagnant Pool'Be Revitalized?" (2010) 35:2 Queen's LJ 625.
Regarding adjustments to the language of instructions, Comiskey observed that
'systematic studies are required to test the overall comprehensibility of the Canadian
instructions and to determine whether modifications according to psycho-linguistic
principles might improve juror understanding": (ibid at 648).
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jurors find persuasive. A recent meta-analysis of studies on the effects of
inadmissible evidence concluded that jurors are more likely to abide by
instructions to disregard when judges explain why the evidence should be
disregarded .2 2 Further, the substance ofthe explanation matters: instructions
to disregard are generally ineffective when no explanation is offered or when
the explanation turns on a perceived "technicality" like the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence. 223 By contrast, instructions to disregard are
relatively effective when jurors are told that evidence is hearsay, irrelevant, or
unreliable. 224 Thus, the empirical research suggests that jurors comply
selectively with admonitions, disregarding evidence they see as lacking in
value but holding on to evidence they see as valuable. 2 5 Applying these
findings to the limited-admissibility context, the effectiveness of limiting
instructions may be enhanced when judges offer a compelling explanation of
the purposes for which the evidence can and cannot be used. 221
222 Steblay et al, supra note 57 at 487.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
22 Two studies demonstrating this selective compliance showed that jurors were more likely
to follow an instruction to disregard wiretap evidence when they were told it was
unreliable than when they were told it was obtained in violation of the accused's rights.
See Saul M Kassin & Samuel R Sommers, "Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to
Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations" (1997) 23:10
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1046 ("jurors... exhibit selective compliance
with instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. . . . [T]hey cannot resist the
temptation to use information they see as relevant-whether it satisfies the law's technical
rules or not" at 1050-51); Samuel R Sommers & Saul M Kassin,"On the Many Impacts
of Inadmissible Testimony: Selective Compliance, Need for Cognition, and the
Overcorrection Bias" (2001) 27:10 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1368. See
also Steblay et al, supra note 57 ("jurors resist giving up evidence that they believe is
probative" at 487).
226 See Leonard, Wigmore, supra note 1, ch 1 ("[i]f the judge's instruction includes a logical
and inherently compelling explanation of the reasons why the evidence is inadmissible for
a particular purpose, there is a greater chance that the jury will choose to follow the
instruction" at 63); Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 49 ("[i]f mock jurors are given a
logical reason for the judge's decisions that they believe is legitimate, then there is
evidence that they are able to obey the admonitions" at 688).
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The research findings on the effects of an explanation have not been
entirely consistent. In one frequently cited study, Pickel found that an
explanation did not help mock jurors disregard inadmissible information."
During a simulated trial, a witness testified that the accused had earlier been
convicted of perjury. 2 2 The judge's instructions on this evidence varied. In
some conditions the jury was simply told that the criminal record was
inadmissible, and in other conditions the judge also explained that ruling.
Mock jurors disregarded the evidence when the judge ruled it inadmissible
without explanation, but those who also received a legal explanation did not
disregard the evidence. 229 In other words, the legal explanation backfired by
inducing mock jurors to rely on the inadmissible evidence.
Superficially, Pickel's results cast doubt on the usefulness of explaining
evidentiary admonitions to juries. However, the results may well flow from
the type ofexplanation used in the mock trial. The judge's entire explanation
was as follows:
According to the rules of evidence, the witness may not testify about crimes
that the defendant allegedly committed because this testimony might
improperly suggest to you that the defendant has a bad character and tends
to behave in the same negative way in all situations.230
On examination, this "explanation" fails to provide any rationale for
disregarding the criminal-record evidence: it simply points to the existence of
a plausible propensity inference and tells the jury to reject that inference as
"improper." One can hardly be surprised that such an explanation would fail
to encourage juror compliance with evidentiary rules. A more substantive
explanation of the reasons to avoid propensity reasoning might have
227 Kerri L Pickel, "InducingJurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence:A Legal Explanation
Does Not Help" (1995) 19:4 Law & Hum Behav 407.
228 Pickel also ran a second experiment in which inadmissible information was excluded as
hearsay. In that experiment, explaining that the evidence was hearsay did not help the
subjects ignore the evidence because they ignored it even without the explanation. See
ibid ("it appears that participants already suspected that hearsay evidence should not be
used and quite easily disregarded it when so instructed" at 419).
229 Ibid at 415.
230 Ibid at 412.
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highlighted the reliability-related concern that bad character evidence can be
overvalued and is considered an untrustworthy indicator ofguilt.231 Even the
non-reliability-related rationales for avoiding propensity reasoning-such as
the basic unfairness ofstacking the deck against an accused with a blemished
past-could have been explained to the jury more persuasively.23 2
Judges seeking to incorporate explanations into their limiting instructions
will have to consider what makes an explanation persuasive to a jury.233 Since
the existing research supports the notion that jurors are persuaded by
reliability-related rationales, judges could likely increase compliance with
limiting instructions by alerting the jury to any pertinent reliability
concerns.2 14 Where the permissible uses of evidence are limited for reasons
unrelated to reliability, judges may simply have to explain those rules as
persuasively as they can.
Some commentators have advocated a "collaborative instruction
approach"3 whereby judges treat jurors as active co-participants in enforcing
legal rules based on a shared understanding of their purposes. The policies
behind the rules are clearly explained to juries in an attempt to enlist their
231 See e.g. Corbett, supra note 5 (noting that even if innocent, an accused with a criminal
record may face a"vicious circle'... .Aperson is suspected and investigated becauseof his
record and the existence of that record increases the likelihood ofhis conviction" at 728).
232 On the various justifications for character-evidence rules, see especially David P Leonard,
"In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations ofthe RuleAgainst Trial
by Character" (1998) 73:4 Ind LJ 1161.
233 See Demaine, supra note 93 ("It is imperative . . . that the explanation be
convincing" at 189).
234 See e.g. Leonard, W'igmore,supra note 1, ch 1 (where limited-use evidence cannot be used
for its truth but only for some non-hearsay purpose, the limiting instruction might "at
least acquaint jurors with the dangers of hearsay, making them skeptical of the evidence
and likely to discount it as proof of the matters asserted, even if they will find it difficult
to ignore the evidence altogether" at 102-102-1); Blinka, "Delusion", supra note 3
("when the distinction between the permissible and impermissible purpose arises from
concerns about the trustworthiness or reliability of the evidence, the fears justifying the
rule should be explained to the jury in an instruction which educates them about the
dangers" at 820).
235 Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, "Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics"
(2001) 87:8 Va L Rev 1857 at 1911.
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co-operation. There is some empirical support for this approach, even in
contexts where the rationale behind the rule is unrelated to reliability. In a
1992 study by Diamond and Caspar, mock jurors watched a video simulation
of an antitrust case and were charged with compensating the plaintiffs for
their damages. 236 Under US law, the damage award would be tripled to
penalize the defendants for the antitrust violations. Mock jurors were either
(1) not told about the treble damages rule, (2) told about the rule without
any instruction about what to do with the information, (3) told about the
rule and instructed that it should not affect their damage awards, or (4) told
about the rule, instructed that it should not affect their awards, and offered
an explanation of why they should not let their awards be affected. That
explanation stressed that reducing awards in anticipation of trebling would
undermine Congress's punitive purpose in enacting the trebling rule. In the
study, the explanation of the rule had the desired effect. Jurors who knew
about the treble damages rule awarded lower damages, but the judge's
explanation of the rationale behind the rule mitigated that effect, thereby
increasing compliance with instructions. Such a collaborative instruction
approach, which brings the policy basis of evidence rules to the fore in the
judge's instructions, seems promising as a method of enhancing the
effectiveness of evidentiary admonitions."' This collaborative approach also
seems attractively consistent with respect for the jury as an institution
capable of adjudicating cases according to law.
Presently in Canadian trials, judges frequently deliver limiting
instructions that lay out the permissible and impermissible uses of evidence
without any discussion of the rationale for those limitations."' Both
236 Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D Casper, "Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury" (1992) 26:3 Law& Soc'y Rev 513.
237 See Demaine, supra note 93 (the Diamond and Casper study "suggests that a policy-based
explanation for an inadmissible ruling can remove the effects of prejudicial inadmissible
evidence" at 188). See also Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 235 (instructions to disregard
should be offered through "a reason-based explanatory instruction" instead of a "simple
admonition" at 1908).
23s For instance, the Canadian Judicial Council's pattern jury instructions suggest charging
juries on the limited purpose for which they can consider the criminal record of an
accused witness in the following minimalist terms: "You have heard that [the accused] has
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common sense and empirical evidence suggest that jurors may not be
motivated to abide by such seemingly arbitrary judicial commands regarding
the analysis ofevidence.23 9 Ifcourts seek to protect some important policy by
limiting the jury's reasoning from evidence, the best strategy may be to help
the jury understand the importance of upholding the value or principle at
stake. It is true that incorporating a rationale would make limiting
instructions somewhat longer and more complex, and complexity in jury
instructions can be a barrier to comprehension. However, on the whole the
proposals presented in the paper would lead to simpler jury instructions,
since many of the limiting instructions that are currently offered would be
eliminated as unnecessary. Where a limiting instruction is necessary to
resolve some real policy conflict between the permissible and impermissible
uses of evidence, surely it is worth the extra time to explain to the jury the
policies underlying the rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Judges must be sorely tempted to take a formalist approach to limited
admissibility. As long as no one looks behind the proposition that juries
follow limiting instructions, limited-admissibility rules seem unproblematic.
However, courts' tendency to content themselves with "solving"
limited-admissibility problems in form but not in substance has generated
some undesirable results. Most obviously, courts continue to rely on limiting
instructions that probably don't constrain jury reasoning in the ways the law
intends. In addition, the courts' refusal to examine the doctrine of limited
admissibility too closely has allowed some untenable distinctions between
previously been convicted of a criminal offence. You must not use the fact that [the
accused] has committed a crime in the past as evidence that s/he committed the crime
charged. You may only consider the fact, (number) and nature of that (those)
conviction(s) to help you decide how much or little of [the accused]'s testimony you will
believe or rely on." Canadian Judicial Council, "Mid-Trial Instructions, Part 7.5", Model
Jury Instructions, online: <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca>.
239 See Lisa Eichhorn, "Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Evidence
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence" (1989) 52:4 Law & Contemp Probs 341 (given "an
explanation of underlying policy[,] ... jurors would view the [admonitions] ... as less
arbitrary and more reasonable" at 353).
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the permissible and impermissible uses ofevidence to become established in
our law of evidence.
The solution to these problems lies in a moderate kind of realism.
Canadian courts should stop refusing to critically appraise their own
procedures for the ostensible purpose of protecting jury legitimacy. They
should at least try to respond to the devastating critiques of
limited-admissibility rules by recognizing the limitations of the doctrine and
attempting to frame instructions that will be as effective as possible.
Ultimately, it is probably not possible to ensure that judges and juries always
use evidence only for permissible purposes; the doctrine of limited
admissibility will remain an uncomfortable compromise. If the courts would
at least acknowledge that discomfort, they might do a better job resolving
limited-admissibility problems.

